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UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE LAW OF 
WILLS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
RONALD J. SCALISE JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
"A son can bear with equanimity the loss of his father, but the 
loss of his inheritance may drive him to despair."1 Indeed, even the 
prospect of a loss of inheritance often drives sons, daughters, 
relatives, and friends to desperate measures.  Consider the following 
scenario: Bob, prior to his death at the age of 90, was a bachelor with 
substantial wealth.  He was survived only by his great-niece, Angela, 
and by his friend, Smith. Angela had only sporadic contact with her 
uncle, which was a source of tension and anger for him. Five years 
before Bob's death, Smith began taking care of him and assisting him 
on a daily basis with meals, transportation, and hygiene. Smith also 
helped Bob with his financial affairs including taking him to an 
attorney to draft a will. Smith encouraged Bob to disinherit his 
thankless niece and leave his money to the people who cared about 
him.  After Bob's death, his will was read, and the entirety of Bob's 
fortune was left to Smith. Angela contests the probate of the will by 
alleging that it was the product of undue influence exercised by 
Smith. 
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 1. Although this translation is commonly used, the literal quote reads: “li uomini 
sdimenticano piú presto la morte del padre che la perdita del patrimonio.” NICCOLÒ 
MACHIAVELLI, IL PRINCIPE 99 (Giuseppe Lisio ed., 1933) (1515).  My thanks to my colleague, 
Lucy McGough, for suggesting this quote to me and to Phillip Gragg and Viçenc Feliu for 
finding it. 
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The above scenario, in one form or another, is a very common 
one.  In deciding how to dispose of his property, a testator, especially 
an elderly one, is subject to a number of influences, some of which 
may be "undue." In light of the advancing age of the population and 
"the high prevalence of cognitive impairment and dementia in older 
adults," the number of contested wills seems only to be increasing.2  
In fact, statistical evidence shows that in American law, "the 
predominant weapon for attempting to undo a will is an allegation of 
undue influence."3 
Perhaps because of the frequency with which undue influence is 
alleged to exist, the concept of "undue influence" has been correctly 
characterized as "one of the most bothersome concepts" in American 
law.4  But the situations addressed by the concept of undue influence 
are not unique to American law.  All societies that recognize freedom 
of testation face problems with self-interested individuals 
inappropriately influencing testators to make otherwise unintended 
dispositions. In fact, in early Roman times, where will making was 
quite common,5 the civil law faced problems with undue influence in 
the realm of wills.6  Surprisingly, though, neither modern French nor 
modern German law contains a concept of undue influence at all.  
This absence is not because of a cultural immunity that prevents civil 
law jurisdictions from facing the above problem.  Instead, the absence 
of undue influence in French and German law can be explained by a 
number of legal institutions and concepts that are the "functional 
equivalent" of undue influence. In other words, the civil law 
 
 2. Kenneth I. Shulman et al., Assessment of Testamentary Capacity and Vulnerability to 
Undue Influence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 722, 722 (2007). 
 3. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests—An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 607, 647 (1987).  See also EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 7:21 
(2d ed. 1999) (stating that "[u]ndue influence is the most commonly asserted ground for 
invalidating a will"). 
 4. JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, JAMES LINDGREN, & ROBERT H. 
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 158 (7th ed. 2005). 
 5. See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO 
JUSTINIAN 365 (3d ed. 1963) (discussing the "horror of intestacy" felt in early Roman times). 
But see David Daube, The Preponderance of Intestacy at Rome, 39 TUL. L. REV. 253, 253 (1964) 
(stating that "[i]t is safe to sum up that, from beginning to end, intestacy was the rule and testacy 
the exception, and both very much so"). 
 6. The second- and third-century jurist Papinian writes of a husband who influences his 
wife not to disinherit him.  DIG. 29.6.3 (Papinian, Replies 15), in 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 
(Theodor Mommsen et al eds. & Alan Watson trans.) 113 (1985) [hereinafter Digest].  Not only 
was Papinian a great jurist of classical Roman law, but his opinion was given primacy of status in 
the Law of Citations of AD 426. See, e.g., PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 
28 (2001). 
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generally, and French and German law in particular, possesses legal 
institutions that serve similar—although not identical—functions and 
purposes as undue influence in American law.7 
This article discusses comparatively the doctrine of undue 
influence in the making of wills.  Although comparative scholarship 
flourishes in the areas of tort and contract law, hardly any 
comparative work exists in the area of succession.8 Indeed while other 
areas of private law have been studied for purposes of unification, 
"the unification or even harmonisation of succession law is not on the 
agenda of any law-making body."9 In that regard, this article attempts 
to fill the gap in comparative private law. Part I surveys the history of 
undue influence from Roman times to the modern day. Part II 
examines the concept and role of undue influence in American law 
and the problems that exist with the doctrine. Part III considers the 
functionally equivalent doctrines that exist in French and German 
law.  Part IV provides comparative insights and lessons. 
I. THE HISTORY OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
The concept of undue influence in American law is a notoriously 
difficult one, and any attempt to define undue influence often 
degenerates into nothing more than platitudes about "substituting 
one's volition for another" and generalities concerning whether a 
testator is "susceptible" to a kind of influence considered "undue" by 
the law. To fully understand the meaning of undue influence, it is 
necessary to examine its historical basis. 
Early Roman law did not provide for challenges to wills based on 
undue influence from others.  In Justinian's 6th century compilation of 
Roman law, the Digest, Paul writes that although an individual may 
 
 7. Although the scope of comparative examination is almost infinite, this article proceeds 
in a traditional fashion of using France and Germany as two different influential families in the 
civil law tradition as a proxy for the civil law. 
 8. Marius J. De Waal, Comparative Succession Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1071, 1074 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) 
("[R]elatively little has been written on the law of succession in a comparative perspective."). 
But see Karl Heinz Neumayer, Intestate Succession, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW: SUCCESSION (2002); Sjef van Erp, New Developments in Succession Law, 
11 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (Dec. 2007), http://www.ejcl.org/113/article113-5.pdf.; EXPLORING 
THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL, HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE (Kenneth 
G.C. Reid, Marius J. de Waal, & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh Studies in Law 2007). 
For an overview of the limited efforts toward harmonizing European succession laws, see Paul 
Terner, Perspectives of a European Law of Succession, 14 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 147 
(2007). 
 9. van Erp, supra note 8, at 2. 
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have been compelled to act under fear, the act is still valid because he 
had the will to act.10 Later, the praetor (a special Roman magistrate 
whose job was, in part, to mitigate the harshness of the ius civile) 
would intervene, at least in extreme cases, such as when acts were 
compelled by duress.11 In the Edict, the praetor stated, "I will not hold 
valid what has been done under duress [metus causa]."12 Although the 
exact meaning of metus causa has been subject to debate, 
"[t]raditionally, the praetor was understood to disapprove of acts 
which had been caused by fear."13 Actual intervention and legal 
protection from fear in juridical acts, however, was not common, as 
"the duress [metus causa] relevant to this edict is not that experienced 
by a weak-minded man but that which reasonably has an effect upon 
a man of the most resolute character."14 The average Roman was 
expected to be "responsible for his actions and his declarations, and 
any attempt to get away from what he had done or said was 
instinctively frowned upon."15  Fear of "death,"16 "prison,"17 or "sexual 
assault"18 were clearly enough to constitute "metus causa," but not 
fear of "infamia" or "annoyance."19 Moreover, being influenced by 
reverence for the opposing party was likewise insufficient.20  
Justinian's Code, a twelve-book compilation of imperial constitutions, 
provides that "the senatorial dignity of your adversary is not alone 
sufficient to cause the fear by which you allege the contract has been 
entered into."21 
Instead, force or fraud was necessary before a will would be 
invalidated.22 The subtle pressure often characteristic of undue 
influence, which occupies a position somewhere between fraud and 
duress, was not recognized as a ground for nullification of a will.  
 
 10. DIG. 4.21.5 (Paul, Edict 11). 
 11. DIG. 4.2.1 (Ulpian, Edict 11). 
 12. Id. 
 13. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 654 (1996). 
 14. DIG. 4.2.6 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 11). 
 15. Jacques du Plessis & Reinhard Zimmermann, The Relevance of Reverence: Undue 
Influence Civilian Style, 10 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 345, 347 (2003). 
 16. DIG. 4.2.7 (Ulpian, Edict 11); see also Code Just. 2.20.7, in THE CIVIL LAW (S. P. Scott 
ed. & trans., 1932) [hereinafter Code Just.]; du Plessis & Zimmermann, supra note 15, at 348. 
 17. DIG. 4.2.7 (Ulpian, Edict 11). 
 18. DIG. 4.2.8 (Paul, Edict 11). 
 19. DIG. 4.2.7 (Ulpian, Edict 11). 
 20. See du Plessis & Zimmermann, supra note 15, at 350-52. 
 21. Code Just. 2.20.6. 
 22. DIG. 4.2.1 (Ulpian, Edict 11). 
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Flattery and general supplications, if not connected with fraudulent 
activity, were insufficient.23 In addition, a showing of force or 
intimidation was necessary to demonstrate that one's freedom of will 
had been compromised.24  The most obvious example of the Roman 
law's disregard for undue influence on a testator comes from 
Papinian: 
I advised that a husband who had intervened to prevent his 
wife from making a codicil when she had changed her 
intentions toward him to his disadvantage and who had used 
neither force nor fraud but, as commonly happens, had 
soothed the displeasure of his upset wife by talking to her as 
a husband, had not committed any crime and what had been 
left to him by will should not be taken away.25 
Moreover, Justinian bolsters Papinian's statement and writes that 
"[i]t is not a criminal act for a husband, by his representations, to 
induce his wife to make her will in his favor."26 
Despite the difficulty in invalidating a will for what is today 
considered undue influence, acts of influence by interested heirs or 
"legacy hunters" certainly existed and, in fact, preoccupied satirists 
and moralists in Roman times.27 The Romans called this kind of 
conduct captatio,28 from the Latin word captare, meaning "to chase 
after," as in one who chases after a legacy.  Pliny, sometime between 
AD 96 and 100, in his letter to Calvisius writes disapprovingly of the 
captative actions of Regulus. Pliny tells of Regulus who visited a 
woman who "was lying seriously ill," but who convinced her to leave 
him a legacy by assuring her that although she was going through a 
critical period, she would survive.29 Shortly after, when the woman 
 
 23. MOSES DROPSIE, ROMAN LAW OF TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND GIFTS IN THE EVENT 
OF DEATH 44-45 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1892). 
 24. Code Just. 6.34.1 (suggesting such forcible conduct was punishable by the criminal law). 
See also DROPSIE, supra note 23, at 44-45. For argument that captatio was not regarded as a 
misdemeanor in Roman law and resulted only in the denial of bonorum possessio and 
confiscation, see J.W. Tellegen, Captatio and Crimen, 26 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS 
DE L'ANTIQUITÉ 387 (1979). 
 25. DIG. 29.6.3 (Papinian, Replies 15). 
 26. Code Just. 6.34.3. 
 27. See EDWARD CHAMPLIN, FINAL JUDGMENTS: DUTY AND EMOTION IN ROMAN WILLS, 
200 B.C. – A.D. 250, at 82-102 (1991).  Despite this preoccupation, the prevalence of undue 
influence in Roman law is disputed.  See id. at 100 ("[T]here is no evidence that captatio existed 
as a widespread social practice."). 
 28. See id. at 101. 
 29. J.W. TELLEGEN, THE ROMAN LAW OF SUCCESSION IN THE LETTERS OF PLINY THE 
YOUNGER 49 (1982). 
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was dying, she realized Regulus's duplicity and proclaimed him 
"wicked and treacherous."30 Furthermore, Pliny recounts that 
Regulus, with an eye to an inheritance, "beseeche[d] and beg[ged] the 
doctors" of an ill, rich man to prolong his life.31 Once the man 
changed his will to favor Regulus, however, Regulus questioned the 
doctors, "How much longer are you going to torture this poor man?"32  
Finally, Regulus "forced" a woman to rewrite her will and leave 
assets to him, all the while "he watched while she was writing and 
checked what she had written."33 As morally condemnable as 
Regulus's conduct was, it was not prohibited by law.  After all, Pliny 
writes of the economic success of Regulus "who by means of these 
evil deeds, has risen from a position of poverty and obscurity to . . . 
great wealth."34 
Despite the widespread references to captatio in Roman 
literature, examples of such conduct seem to be limited to persons 
outside the testator's family.  Although captatio exerted by family 
members is imaginable, "captatio as presented by historians, satirists 
and moralists d[id] not allow for that possibility."35 Instead, it seemed 
to be limited to "the denial of family claims, the rupture of family ties, 
the triumph of the outsider—the possibility of a member of the family 
captating as well is out of the question."36 The closest family relation 
who seems to have been guilty of such captatio was the stepmother. 
Gaius writes that parents generally disinherit their children "when 
they have been led astray by the blandishments or incitements of 
stepmothers."37 And even then such influence was only prohibited if it 
led the testator to pass over or disinherit one who had a legal claim to 
a parent's estate.38 
Perhaps because of the broad tolerance of influence on testators, 
Roman law enacted an outright prohibition on legacies to those most 
able (and perhaps most likely) to unduly influence a testator, namely, 
 
 30. Id. at 53. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. For a warning as to the reliability of Pliny's view of Regulus, see CHAMPLIN, supra 
note 27, at 99. 
 35. CHAMPLIN, supra note 27, at 89. See also TELLEGEN, supra note 29, at 53. 
 36. CHAMPLIN, supra note 27, at 89. 
 37. DIG. 5.2.4 (Gaius, Lex Glitia) (discussing claims for undutiful will or the querela 
inofficiosi testamenti). 
 38. Id. 
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witnesses to wills.39 According to Justinian's Institutes (a textbook 
summarizing Roman law for students), not only can an heir not serve 
as a witness to a will, but neither can his brother, father, or anyone 
under his control.40 Although early Roman law appears to have 
reluctantly allowed close relatives to serve as witnesses to wills, 
Justinian explicitly prohibited what the ancient authorities had only 
discouraged.41 Even at the time of Ulpian, however, the prohibition 
seems to have been clear: "A person instituted heir in a will cannot be 
a witness to the same will."42 This idea was a specific application of 
the more general principle that "[n]o one is a satisfactory witness in 
his own cause."43 The Roman preference for disinterested witnesses is 
at least in part to prevent fraudulent and captative conduct of others.44 
"[M]edieval lawyers were more sympathetic to those who did not 
meet the exacting standard of the vir constantissimus, and had thus 
become the victim of fear, than had been the Roman lawyers of the 
classical period."45 The influential glossator Accursius writes that a 
wife can rescind a sale or mortgage entered into on account not only 
of fear but also out of reverence.46  Even more so, the sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century scholars of the ius commune seem to have been 
sensitive to undue influence on donors of weakened constitution.  
Matthaeus de Afflictis, the sixteenth-century Neapolitan jurist, writes 
of the invalidity of a disposition of immovable property from a wife to 
her husband when the legacy was made on the wife's deathbed and 
after her husband secretly entered the room and flattered her into 
leaving the legacy to him.47 Later, Samuel Pufendorf, the seventeenth-
century natural law scholar, in describing the ambulatory character of 
a will and the importance of individual will and intention, states that 
"the law of humanity demands that no man be deceived with empty 
 
 39. DROPSIE, supra note 23, at 80 ("One cannot be a witness to the testament in which he 
is instituted as heir."). 
 40. J. INST. 2.10.10, in THE CIVIL LAW (S.P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932) [hereinafter J. INST.]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. DIG. 28.1.20 (Ulpian, Sabinus 1). 
 43. DIG. 22.5.10 (Pomponius, Sabinus 1). 
 44. See DROPSIE, supra note 23, at 77. This prohibition was limited, however, only to heirs, 
who under Roman law succeeded to the decedent's entire estate. Legatees, or those receiving 
only individual dispositions, could be witnesses, as "they [we]re not universal successors." J. 
INST. 2.10.11. 
 45. du Plessis & Zimmermann, supra note 15, at 352. 
 46. Id. at 352 (quoting the Accursian Gloss, "Et nota hic argumentum quod mulier quae 
rem suam vendidit vel hypothecavit, si renuntiavit metu vel reverentia, quod possit revocare."). 
 47. Id. at 357 (quoting and citing MATTHAEUS DE AFFLICTIS, DECISIONUM SACRI REGNI 
NEAPOLITANI CONSILII (Francofurti 1600), Dec. LXIX). 
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hopes."48 Johannes Voet, in his commentary on the Digest, similarly 
concludes that a will can be nullified due to "acts and tokens from 
which it can be inferred that compulsion, intimidation or 
unreasonable and fraudulent fawnings have taken place with the 
object of extorting or obstructing a last will."49 
The Roman-Dutch version of the ius commune in the 
seventeenth century also continued the Roman prohibition on heirs 
as witnesses "because [the witness] would be directly a witness in his 
own cause, since it is believed that the whole of this transaction which 
is undertaken with the object of arranging a last will is undertaken 
between testator and heir."50 In addition, no one who has written a 
will for another could receive anything under the will.51 Specifically, a 
notary and his near relatives were forbidden from receiving anything 
under a will that he had written for another.52 
Despite the increasing recognition of the nullifying effect of 
undue influence on the continent, undue influence does not appear to 
have spread to England in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
even from the ecclesiastical courts whose influence in testamentary 
matters was strong.53 Cases as early as 1737 used the concept of undue 
 
 48. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 614 (C.H. 
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688). Pufendorf applauds Pliny's praise of Domitius 
Tullus. Id. at 615. Pliny describes  Domitius Tullus as a man whose "limbs were so dislocated 
and deformed that he could only perceive his wealth with his eyes and could only move in his 
bed with the help of others," and who despite expectations, left legacies to his daughter, 
grandchild, and great grandchild, much to the disappointment of the "perverse hopes" of the 
"legacy-hunters" who had courted him.  TELLEGEN, supra note 29, at 152-53. 
 49. 5 JOHANNES VOET, THE SELECTIVE VOET BEING THE COMMENTARY ON THE 
PANDECTS 79 (Percival Gane trans., 1956) (1829). 
 50. 4 id. at 617. See also 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HOLLAND 137 (R.W. 
Lee trans., 1936) ("Under witness might not be included the instituted heir; but a legatee 
might."). 
 51. 5 VOET, supra note 49, at 278.  Roman law appears to have allowed those to whom 
wills were dictated to also receive a legacy under the same will.  Marcian states that a son or a 
slave could receive a legacy under a will dictated to them if the testator signed a "general 
clause" confirming the will.  DIG. 48.10.1.8 (Marcian, Institutes 14).  If, on the other hand, the 
party writing the will was a stranger, before he could receive a legacy under the will, the testator 
would have to sign a specific clause stating, "which I have dictated to him and have confirmed."  
Id. 
 52. 5 VOET, supra note 49, at 279. 
 53. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 89 (1995) ("In England, more than in 
most regions of medieval Europe, canonical courts became the regular forum for the probate of 
wills and testaments and the disposition of claims arising under them.  The dominance of canon 
law over probate jurisdiction was already well-established by the end of the twelfth century and 
Glanvill refers to it as if it were a routine matter that secular courts did not contest.").  Glanvill 
states plainly, "[P]leas concerning testaments ought to be dealt with before an ecclesiastical 
judge." THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY 
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influence in transactions involving parents and children,54 but it was 
not until the nineteenth century that the concept of undue influence 
took hold in England, first in the context of inter vivos donative 
transactions and then in the context of wills.  There, the concern of a 
parent unduly influencing a child to bestow a gift in his favor was so 
great that courts took action. In Morris v. Burroughs, the court stated 
that "to prevent any undue influence . . . there must . . . be a valuable 
consideration moving from the father, and an actual benefit accruing 
to the child."55 Subsequent cases extended the vitiating role of undue 
influence to gifts made from clients to solicitors.56 The French 
doctrinal writer, Robert Pothier, seems to have been influential in the 
development of the idea of undue influence in the common law.57 In 
Huguenin v. Baseley, penitents making gifts to clergy were the subject 
 
CALLED GLANVILL, bk. VII, pt. 8,at 81 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1965).  See also 6 HENRICI DE 
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, bk. V, treatise 5, at 167 (Travers 
Twiss trans., 1883) ("[A] laic is not to be convened before an ecclesiastical judge concerning any 
matter, which pertains to the crown . . . .  Likewise neither concerning debts nor chattels, unless 
they are concerning a testament or matrimony or such like . . . ."). On the continent, 
testamentary matters appear to have been under the jurisdiction of both secular and 
ecclesiastical courts.  "Civil law and secular courts on the Continent were less ready than their 
English counterparts to yield control over testamentary matters to the church."  BRUNDAGE, 
supra, at 89; COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISIS OF PHILIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR 153 (F.R.P. Akehurst 
trans., 1992) ("And if the suit over a will is brought to an end in a secular court, however it is 
administered, and for whatever parties, the ecclesiastical court can inquire how the case went, so 
that if there is something to be set right, it can be set right by the ecclesiastical court, for it is 
they who, more than other people, have authority over what is done for the salvation of souls."). 
 54. Morris v. Burroughs, (1737) 1 Atk. 398 (U.K.). See also W.H.D. Winder, Undue 
Influence and Coercion, 3 MOD. L. REV. 97, 98 (1939). 
 55. Morris, 1 Atk. at 403. See also Winder, supra note 54, at 98. 
 56. Welles v. Middleton, (1784) 1 Cox 112 (U.K.).  See also Winder, supra note 54, at 100. 
 57. See GEORGE W. KEETON & L.A. SHERIDAN, EQUITY 263 (3d ed. 1987) (noting that 
the Court of Chancery was "struggling with the problem of the undue influence exercised by 
husbands upon wives to compel them to surrender their property" and stating that "it would 
seem that the Court of Chancery was influenced by Pothier's treatise, Traité des donations entre 
vifs").  For a more measured estimation of the role of Pothier in the Chancery Court's 
formulation of undue influence, see Gerhard Lubbe, Voidable Contracts, in SOUTHERN CROSS: 
CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 261, 296 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel 
Visser eds., 1996) (noting that "Lord Eldon's judgment, however, contains no reference to 
Pothier" and that "Keeton and Sheridan's claim seems to be based on the heads of argument 
presented to the Court by Samuel Romilly"). See generally du Plessis & Zimmermann, supra 
note 15, at 363-64.  For other important influences of Pothier on the common law, see, for 
example, Joseph M. Perillo, Robert J. Pothier's Influence on the Common Law of Contract, 11 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 267, 272 (2005); Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in 
the Civil Law?: A Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 
AM. J. COMP. L. 721 (2007). 
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of undue influence allegations.58 In his argument to the court on 
behalf of the plaintiffs in Huguenin, Sir Romilly stated that 
"[a]ccording to Pothier, it has been decided, upon the same principles 
of public utility, that a confessor, or director of conscience, a person 
to whom another trusted his spiritual concerns in matters of religion, 
cannot take any bounty from the person to whom he acts in that 
character."59 
In an early and seminal case in the English probate courts, Hall 
v. Hall, the jury was instructed that "[t]o make a good will a man must 
be a free agent.  But all influences are not unlawful. Persuasion, 
appeals to the affections or ties of kindred, to a sentiment of gratitude 
for past services, or pity for future destitution, or the like, —these are 
all legitimate, and may be fairly pressed on a testator."60 What is 
forbidden in the context of testaments is "pressure of whatever 
character, whether acting on the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to 
overpower the volition without convincing the judgment."61 This, the 
court instructed, was "a species of restraint under which no valid will 
can be made."62 In short, the court stated, "a testator may be led but 
not driven; and his will must be the offspring of his own volition, and 
not the record of some one else's."63 
Shortly thereafter, the English probate courts made clear that the 
presumption of undue influence that arises in the Courts of Equity 
based upon the relationship of the parties does not exist in the 
probate courts.64 In Parfitt v. Lawless, a priest who lived with the 
decedent and served as her confessor received the bulk of the 
decedent's estate under her will. The court held that the priest's role 
and "his position in the house" were alone not enough to prove 
undue influence.65 Although the defendant had relied upon "cases . . . 
related to gifts inter vivos decided in the courts of equity," the court 
rejected such arguments because "as regards wills, if there be capacity 
and a knowledge of business proved or admitted, and an expressed 
desire to do what was done, undue influence cannot be presumed 
 
 58. Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Ves. 273 (1807), in 2 A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN 
EQUITY WITH NOTES (Frederick Thomas White & Owen Davies Tudor eds., 1877). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Hall v. Hall, (1868) 1 L.R.P. & D. (Ct. Prob. & Divorce) (U.K.). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Parfitt v. Lawless, (1872) 2 L.R.P. & D. (Ct. Prob. & Divorce) (U.K.). 
 65. Id. 
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from the mere position of the parties."66 Moreover, the court stated 
that "it is very doubtful whether the same meaning [of undue 
influence in Probate Courts] is attached to those words in the courts 
of equity. In testamentary cases it is always defined as coercion or 
fraud, but inter vivos no such definition is applied."67 
It was not until the nineteenth century that American law, via 
importation from England, received the doctrine of undue influence. 
The English prohibition on attesting witnesses receiving legacies 
under the will was "generally adopted in the United States as a 
salutary provision."68 Early treatises cited English cases such as 
Huguenin v. Baseley and readily adopted the doctrine of undue 
influence.69 Thomas Jarman's influential treatise on wills was 
published "with notes and references to American decisions" in 
1845,70 and at that time, undue influence was limited to discussion of 
the English case of Mountain v. Bennett, in which a will was 
challenged on the grounds of "undue influence . . . [by] the testator's 
wife, whom he married from an inferior station."71 The discussion of 
the topic occurs in the Chapter on "Personal Disabilities of Testators" 
and in the midst of a discussion of the ability of lunatics to make wills. 
By the time the second American edition of Jarman's work was 
published in 1849, the editors "added to the original text chapters" an 
entire section on "Undue Influence," which is produced with copious 
citations to American cases.72 In Woerner's multivolume treatise on 
the American Law of Administration, first published in 1889, English 
and American cases on undue influence are cited interchangeably 
thus giving the impression that the doctrine of undue influence in 
wills was the same in the two jurisdictions.73 
Despite the increasing prevalence of undue influence cases in 
nineteenth-century America, the case law was strict in the kind of 
influence necessary before it would be considered undue. Mere 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. Moreover, the English rule, even more strictly than that provision of the ius 
commune, invalidated any testamentary transfer to an attesting witness.  25 George II. 
 68. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 509 (6th ed. 1848). 
 69. See, e.g., 2 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 
412-14 (3d ed. 1846); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 248, 251, 256, 263 (1886). 
 70. THOMAS JARMAN, TREATISE ON WILLS (1st American ed. 1845). 
 71. Id. at 30 (citing Mountain v. Bennett, (1787) 1 Cox. 353, 355 (U.K.)). 
 72. THOMAS JARMAN, TREATISE ON WILLS 36-40 (2d American ed. 1849). 
 73. See 1 J.G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION § 
31, at 45-49 & nn. 8-9, at 47 (1889). 
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circumstantial evidence of undue influence was not enough; proof of 
actual coercion or fraud was necessary. For example, in rejecting a 
claim for undue influence against a wife of an inebriated testator, the 
court in Gardner v. Gardner rhetorically asked, "Was there fraud? 
Was there terror? Was there harassing importunity, and a compliance 
for the sake of peace in the dying hour!"74 Similarly, in O'Neall v. 
Farr, the court rejected the claim of undue influence leveled against a 
female slave who received a large disposition after a testator’s death 
and who had served as his paramour. Even though "she derived from 
her situation a certain degree of influence, and that she was indulged 
in her wishes in the management of the domestic affairs," no undue 
influence existed.75 
By the twentieth century it was still standard practice to read 
discussions about undue influence in law school textbooks that made 
clear that the kind of influence needed to invalidate a will "always 
contains an element of coercion or fraud."76 Treatises explained that 
for there "to be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be 
coercion."77 Coercion, it is said, could "consist of actual violence, of 
threats expressed or implied, or of harassing importunity."78 An 
important early student textbook on wills describes the kind of 
influence that does not qualify as undue as follows: 
[C]onsiderations addressed to a testator's good feelings, 
simply influencing his better judgment; the earnest 
solicitations of a wife, or the exercise of influence springing 
from family relations, or from motives of duty, affection, or 
gratitude; persuasion, argument, or flattery; kindness and 
attentions to the testator; and influence worthily exerted for 
the benefit of others, cannot be considered "undue," so as to 
affect the validity of a will inspired thereby.79 
Despite some statements by others to contrary, Rood wrote in 
the early twentieth century that he had "not found a decision refusing 
a will probate on the ground that the testator was induced to make it 
by sweet speeches made with the design of procuring the will."80  Wills 
 
 74. Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526 (1839). 
 75. O'Neall v. Farr, 1 Rich. 80 (S.C. 1844). 
 76. THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES INCLUDING WILLS 18 (W.M. F. Woerner & F.A. 
Wislizenus eds., 1913) [hereinafter DECEDENTS' ESTATES]. 
 77. JOHN R. ROOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 176, at 105 (1904). 
 78. Id. at 106. 
 79. DECEDENTS' ESTATES, supra note 76, at 19. 
 80. ROOD, supra note 77, § 181, at 110. 
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made in favor of paramours or mistresses to the exclusion of one's 
lawful spouse and children were condemned morally but upheld as 
long as the testator disposed of the property according to his own 
wishes.81 It is clear that the question of undue influence was "whether 
the testator had the intelligence enough to detect the fraud, and 
strength of will enough to resist the influence brought to bear upon 
him."82 
Not long after, however, the concept of undue influence in 
American law was liberalized.  Throughout the twentieth century, the 
English rule that undue influence was never presumed was softened 
to allow circumstantial evidence, such as the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship between the testator and legatee (e.g., attorney/client), to 
"raise[] the presumption of undue influence, which [was] fatal to the 
bequest unless rebutted by proof of full deliberation and spontaneity 
on the part of the testator, and good faith on the part of the legatee."83  
The Michigan Supreme Court explained that "[t]here are certain 
cases in which the law indulges in the presumption that undue 
influence has been used, as where a patient makes a will in favor of 
his physician, a client in favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor 
of a priest or spiritual adviser."84 
By the 1920s, although physical coercion or threats could still 
constitute undue influence, the "more common kind of undue 
influence . . . [was] where the mind and the will of the testator have 
been overpowered and subjected to the will of another, so that while 
the testator appeared to execute willingly and intelligently, it was 
really the will of another."85 When Atkinson wrote his famous 
handbook on wills in the 1940s concepts of "coercion" are 
deemphasized,86 and undue influence is explained as "destroy[ing] the 
free agency of the testator" and "substitut[ing] another's volition for" 
the testator's.87 The "ordinary case of undue influence," according to 
Atkinson, occurs not in the case of explicit coercion, but in the case in 
which the testator executes a will that merely "does not represent his 
 
 81. Id. § 182, at 110-11 (citing numerous decisions). 
 82. DECEDENTS' ESTATES, supra note 76, at 19 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. at 20 (noting also that in some states the mere relationship did not create a 
presumption but simply mandated "jealous scrutiny" of the transaction and further proof of 
"some act of the beneficiary, however slight . . . connecting him with the will"). 
 84. In re Hartlerode's Will, 148 N.W. 774, 777 (Mich. 1914). 
 85. 1 JAMES SCHOULER, LAW OF WILLS: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS § 263, at 325 
(6th ed. 1923). 
 86. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 256 (2d ed. 1953). 
 87. Id. 
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true wish or desire."88 Moreover, it was clear that when a legatee 
engaged in some activity to procure a will in his favor, "such 
relationships as those of attorney and client, clergyman and 
parishioner, physician and patient, or close business associates are 
sufficient to give rise to a presumption" of undue influence.89 Later, 
Mortmain Statutes that allowed spouses and children to nullify death 
bed gifts to charities and which were originally motivated by the fear 
of "overreaching by priests taking the last confession and will," were 
either repealed or declared unconstitutional.90 
II. THE ROLE OF AND PROBLEMS WITH UNDUE 
INFLUENCE 
As elusive a concept as undue influence is and has been, its role 
in assessing the validity of wills is significant. At bottom, a will is a 
"legal expression or declaration of a person's mind or wishes as to the 
disposition of his property, to be performed or take effect after his 
death."91 In addition to the compliance with certain formalities, for a 
will to be effective, a person's mind must be free to voluntarily choose 
both the action (i.e., the making of a will) and the disposition of his 
property in favor of certain intended beneficiaries.  In other words, 
autonomy is crucial for the making of an effective will, and "an 
autonomous individual is 'free from both controlling interferences by 
others and personal limitations . . . that prevent meaningful choice.'"92 
The law of undue influence attempts to protect this autonomy and 
freedom of choice by invalidating wills that are not the products of 
the full volition and untrammeled will of the testator.93 If freedom of 
testation did not exist and society were instead governed by a system 
of collective inheritance, undue influence would be unimportant. In 
 
 88. Id. at 257. 
 89. Id. at 550. 
 90. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 869. Georgia is the lone exception. See, e.g., GA. 
CODE ANN. § 53-2-10 (2008). For a discussion of the role of mortmain statutes and undue 
influence in religiously-motivated giving, see Jeffrey G. Sherman, Can Religious Influence Ever 
Be "Undue" Influence?, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 579 (2008). 
 91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (6th ed. 1990). 
 92. Trent J. Thornley, Note, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the Foundation of 
Undue Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 524 (1996) (quoting TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1989)). 
 93. See generally Nicole M. Reina, Notes & Comments, Protecting Testamentary Freedom 
in the United States by Introducing the Concept of the French Notaire, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 427 (2003); see also Melanie B.  Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1996). 
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America, however, where autonomy and, thus, freedom of testation 
are paramount, undue influence plays a central role in ensuring that 
only completely free and autonomous dispositions are honored. 
In addition to protecting autonomy, the doctrine of undue 
influence has the derivative effect of helping to protect the natural 
objects of the testator's bounty, who are likely members of the 
decedent's immediate family. Because the default rules of intestate 
succession generally favor one's close familial relations, deviations 
from those rules by a will may only be done by a free, deliberate, and 
voluntary choice of the testator. To the extent a testamentary 
disposition has been "unduly" caused or influenced (oftentimes by 
one outside the normal order of succession), the will is invalid and 
thus one's close familial relations are recognized in the intestate 
distribution scheme and protected from disinheritance. 
Of course, part of the problem with undue influence is detecting 
it.  "Every one is more or less swayed by his associations with other 
persons. Obviously the courts would not characterize all such 
environmental influence as undue."94 For influence to be undue, "the 
influence must place the testator in the attitude of saying: 'It is not my 
will but I must do it.'"95 Threats to abandon a sick testator, unless he 
makes a will favorable to the influencer, have been held to be undue.96 
Likewise, appeals to affections or emotions have also been 
characterized as examples of undue influence.97 It is even possible that 
"excessive flattering attentions may cause disallowance of the will."98 
In an attempt to help identify instances of undue influence, many 
courts have adopted a four-pronged test to assess whether the 
influence exerted upon a testator is undue. That is, (1) the testator 
must be susceptible of such influence, (2) the influencer must have 
the opportunity to exercise such influence, (3) the influencer must 
have the disposition to do so, and (4) the influencer must achieve the 
coveted result.99 As pervasive as this test is, it is often vague and 
unhelpful. Some courts have characterized it as "almost totally 
meaningless" and containing elements that "beg[] the question."100  
 
 94. ATKINSON, supra note 86, at 256. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 15.3, at 826 (2003) [hereinafter PAGE]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. ATKINSON, supra note 86, at 258 (citing Keller v. Keller, 86 A. 1065, 1066 (1913)). 
 99. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 158-59. 
 100. Succession of Reeves, 704 So.2d 252, 259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997) (criticizing the test in 
reference to influence exerted by a spouse). 
SCALISE__FMT5.DOC 11/19/2008  3:19:20 PM 
56 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:41 
Given the difficulties faced by courts in ascertaining the motives of 
recipients under wills and the state of mind of those now deceased, 
circumstantial evidence must be used to prove undue influence.101 
Consequently, courts have, perhaps unknowingly, adopted a series of 
rules of thumb for detecting when undue influence is likely to exist.  
These objective indicia, although helpful in some cases, seem to 
depart from the ultimate goal of ascertaining when a testament is not 
the product of the free volition of the testator. The following 
circumstances have become objective indicia of the nebulous concept 
of undue influence. 
A. Relationship of Confidence 
First, and perhaps most importantly, relationships of confidence 
between testator and influencer, such as attorney and client, have 
been held by some courts to create a presumption of undue influence 
when the beneficiary receives a disproportionate benefit.102 For 
example, in Delapp v. Pratt, a Tennessee appellate court evaluated a 
claim by a group of siblings against their brother for having unduly 
influenced their mother to leave to him the family farm.103 The 
brother not only lived next door to their mother but also farmed the 
family land and was given his mother's power of attorney.104 In 
affirming the jury verdict finding undue influence, the court stated 
that "the existence of a confidential relationship followed by a 
transaction wherein the dominant party receives a benefit from the 
other party, [raises] a presumption of undue influence . . . that may be 
rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence of the fairness of the 
transaction."105 
Other courts require both a confidential relationship and 
"suspicious circumstances" to exist before such a presumption arises. 
These "suspicious circumstances" must surround the "preparation, 
execution, or formulation of the donative transfer."106 The 
 
 101. Roy D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 582 (1997). 
 102. ROSS & REED, supra note 3, § 7:11.  Some courts have steadfastly held that that "undue 
influence can never be presumed and must be proved by direct and circumstantial evidence."  
See id. § 7:11 at 7-53 - 7-54 (citing cases from Indiana, Iowa, North Dakota, West Virginia, and 
D.C.). 
 103. Delapp v. Pratt, 152 S.W.3d 530, 532-33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 104. Id. at 541. 
 105. Id. at 540 (quoting Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tenn. 1995)). 
 106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
8.3 cmt. f (2003). 
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presumption of undue influence exists in the above instances because 
"[s]uspicious circumstances raise an inference of an abuse of the 
confidential relationship between the alleged wrongdoer and the 
donor."107 Among the circumstances considered "suspicious" are "the 
extent to which the alleged wrongdoer participated in the preparation 
or procurement of the will or will substitute" and "whether the will or 
will substitute was prepared in secrecy or in haste."108 "The effect of 
the presumption is to shift to the proponent the burden of persuasion. 
The presumption justifies a judgment for the contestant as a matter of 
law only if the proponent does not come forward with evidence to 
rebut the presumption."109 
B. Age and Mental State of the Testator 
Another fertile ground for undue influence cases exists when 
wills are made by testators whose mental status, while capable, is of a 
weakened state. The frequency with which cases involve both claims 
of incapacity and undue influence should not be surprising. After all, 
"[p]roof of undue influence requires a showing that another party's 
influence on the testator was so great that the influencer was able to 
substitute his wishes for those of the testator. Clearly, the lower the 
mental capacity of the testator, the easier it is to convince a jury or 
court of the existence of undue influence."110 
In the words of one popular trusts and estates textbook, "[a] 
robust, independent testator is generally less susceptible to undue 
influence than a dependent, weakened testator. Courts often require 
evidence of 'weakened intellect' or 'weakened mental state' before 
they will sustain a finding of undue influence."111 Courts often use 
facts such as old age and frailty in analyzing whether a decedent was 
"susceptible" to undue influence. In so doing, one court has noted 
that "[w]hile not determinative, the primary factors to be considered 
are testator's age, personality, physical and mental health, and his 
ability to handle business affairs."112 
 
 107. Id. § 8.3 cmt. h. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. § 8.3 cmt. f. 
 110. Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's 
Love Got to do with It?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 841, 845 (1996). 
 111. JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 437 (3d ed. 2007). 
 112. In re Estate of Hamm, 227 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Wis. 1975). 
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On many occasions, advanced age even stands in as a proxy for 
weakened mental state.  Some scholars suggest that most victims of 
undue influence are older and that no cases of undue influence 
involve younger people.113 Thus, it is almost inevitable that the 
number of undue influence claims will increase with the aging of the 
population.114  Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is that 
older people suffer greater instances of physical and mental decline 
than younger ones, which thus makes them more susceptible to undue 
influence.115 Commentators have suggested that the tendency of 
courts to use advanced age as a proxy for an unduly influenced 
testator "represents prejudicial attitudes about the elderly that equate 
being older with being mentally frail and emotionally susceptible."116 
C. Abnormal Disposition 
Finally, scholars have noted that the doctrine of undue influence 
"permits a will to be invalidated because of judicial disapproval of the 
testamentary plan of distribution."117 In other words, the more 
abnormal or uncommon the disposition, the greater the chance a 
court will find undue influence. Somewhat ironically, however, the 
standard of normality often used to assess the naturalness of the 
disposition is whether it accords with the state's intestate scheme, 
which after all is supposed to model the intent of the average 
person.118 Thus, provision for one's heirs, spouse, and close relatives is 
viewed as natural and normal, whereas leaving one's estate to a 
random associate or new acquaintance is viewed as abnormal or 
unnatural.119 "[R]eliance on people outside of the formal family 
structure is only countenanced when the family has done something 
to 'deserve' being disinherited."120 This conclusion is somewhat 
understandable given that "the catalyst and strength of all undue 
influence cases is the perceived 'unnaturalness' of the testamentary 
disposition."121 
 
 113. Frolik, supra note 110, at 844. 
 114. Id. at 879. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. at 852. 
 117. Id. at 868. 
 118. Madoff, supra note 101, at 590. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 591. 
 121. Id. at 589. 
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Similarly, the exclusion of one heir in favor of other heirs is also 
viewed as unnatural, unless the excluded heir has done something to 
merit disinheritance. For instance, in Murphy v. O'Neill, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court considered an allegation of undue influence 
against a testator's son in a suit brought by the testator's three other 
children and eight grandchildren.122 Although the court ultimately 
ordered a new trial because of an erroneous jury instruction, it did 
note that "[t]here is a body of case law which may be cited for the 
proposition that an unexplained, unnatural disposition in a will, when 
considered with other factors, can give rise to the drawing of an 
inference of undue influence."123 In explaining the reason for such an 
inference, the court stated that in such cases, "one instinctively seeks 
for an explanation" of the decedent's conduct.124 If the other party 
offers no proof to rebut the presumption, the party alleging undue 
influence is entitled to have the issue decided by the jury and "runs 
the risk that the jury may find against him . . . ."125 
Some have explained the phenomenon in evolutionary biological 
terms by stating that "[w]e share an unconscious impulse to promote 
our genetic survival by assisting our genetic descendants, and we 
collectively express that instinct by the application of the doctrine of 
undue influence."126 Others have explained this phenomenon by 
stating that "family protectionism is built into the very fabric of the 
undue influence doctrine."127 While the doctrine of undue influence 
purports to protect the testator against nefarious influences of others, 
the doctrine also "protect[s] the testator's biological family from 
disinheritance."128 "Thus, the impact of the undue influence doctrine 
is to act as a form of forced heirship. People can either provide for a 
'natural' disposition of their property themselves (i.e., to their 
families) or the court will do it for them via the intestacy statutes."129 
While none of the above factors—mental status, abnormal 
disposition, or confidential relationship—necessarily demonstrates 
the existence of undue influence, the more significant the coincidence 
of these factors, the greater the likelihood that a court will find the 
 
 122. Murphy v. O'Neill, 454 A.2d 248, 249 (R.I. 1983). 
 123. Id. at 249. 
 124. Id. at 250 (quoting Huebel v. Baldwin, 119 A. 639 (R.I. 1923)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Frolik, supra note 110, at 843. 
 127. Madoff, supra note 101, at 577. 
 128. Id. at 577. 
 129. Id. at 611. 
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existence of undue influence. Thus, an aged, weak testator who in her 
will favors exclusively a distant relative who helped draft the will is a 
prime candidate for an undue influence suit. 
III. FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS OF UNDUE INFLUENCE130 
After having assessed the role of and problems with the doctrine 
of undue influence, foreign systems will now be examined to consider 
how those same problems are dealt with abroad. In doing so, the 
functionalist approach shall be employed. Functionalism has been 
described as "[t]he basic methodological principle of all comparative 
law."131 At its foundation, functionalism involves examining multiple 
legal systems to determine whether they have the same legal rules or 
institutions that provide the same solutions to the same problems, 
different rules or institutions that provide different solutions to the 
same problems, or the absence of certain rules or institutions to deal 
with a problem altogether.132 "A diligent search for similarities and 
differences ought to encompass all of those possibilities," and the 
comparatist needs to be aware that sometimes similar solutions often 
disguise themselves under different names.133 In that vein, Part III of 
this paper examines French and German law—systems without an 
explicit concept of undue influence—in an effort to locate those 
functional equivalents to undue influence. 
A. Explicit Prohibitions: Captation and Dispositions Contra Bonos 
Mores 
Although French law does not recognize an explicit concept of 
undue influence in any legislative text, it does doctrinally and 
jurisprudentially acknowledge captation and suggestion.  The concept 
of captation is defined, much like undue influence, as "[t]he act of one 
who succeeds in controlling the will of another, so as to become a 
 
 130. A thoroughly comprehensive examination of the issue of undue influence would 
include the different approaches to mistake or error in each jurisdiction, but such an 
examination is beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in a subsequent article. 
 131. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
 132. John C. Reitz, How to do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 622 (1998).  See 
also Jaakko Husa, About the Methodology of Comparative Law—Some Comments Concerning 
the Wonderland (Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 5, 2007), available at 
http://www .uni maas.nl/bestand.asp?id=9343.  For an overview on the debate about the merits 
of functionalism, see Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or 
Differences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 8, at 383-419. 
 133. Reitz, supra note 132, at 622; see also Husa, supra note 132. 
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master of it."134 "Captation consists in capturing the confidence of a 
person to attract his good graces with the goal of obtaining a 
liberality; suggestion resides in the act of influence on the will of a 
person (for example, in stirring up the aversion in this regard to other 
members of the entourage) to the same end."135 In the 18th Century 
captation was characterized merely as maneuvers designed to elicit a 
disposition in one's favor.136 A legacy was procured by suggestion 
when it was made by a donor without having full will and in an 
attempt to free himself of solicitations.137 Although captation and 
suggestion are conceptually different, the two are often considered 
together under the title of captation, which is not infrequently alleged 
in the context of testators weakened by illness.138 
Historically, the pre-code regime in France took a very broad 
approach to invalidating wills based upon undue influence. In fact, "it 
was possible to invalidate a will inspired by a blind and unjust hatred 
of legitimate relatives."139 The Ordinance of 1735 introduced 
legislation that annulled certain dispositions on grounds of 
"captation" or "suggestion."140 Certain authors were particularly strict 
on these matters and considered "all dispositions of which the testator 
had not had the initiative" to be blemished by suggestion.141 Domat, 
on the other hand, was more permissive and allowed many forms of 
influence that others would prohibit: 
We must not confound with the unlawful ways . . . certain 
ways which a great many persons make use of to engage the 
 
 134. BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (11th ed. 1865). The concept of captation is, in 
modern times, thought of in terms of incapacity.  Incapacities in French law are of two types, 
absolute and relative incapacities.  See PHILIPPE MALAURIE, DROIT CIVIL: LES SUCCESSIONS 
LES LIBÉRALITÉS 155 (2d ed. 2006).  Absolute incapacities are those concerning age and mental 
status and affect all testators.  See id. at 156-57. Relative incapacities are those that affect only 
certain person's ability to give to specific other persons and exist only by virtue of the 
relationship between the parties.  See id. at 165. Certain relationships, as will be discussed 
below, create relative incapacities and rest on a presumption of captation.  See id. 
 135. HENRI MAZEAUD ET AL., SUCCESSIONS – LIBÉRALITÉS No. 1343, at 554 n.1, in 
LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL t.IV, V. II (1999) (author's translation); ANDRÉ TRASBOT &  YVON 
LOUSSOUARN, DONATIONS ET TESTAMENTS, in 5 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 
TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 272 n.2 (2d ed. 1957). 
 136. MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, No. 2877, at 412 (La. 
State L. Inst. transl. 1959) (1939). See also ROBERT POTHIER, TRAITÉ DES DONATIONS 
TESTAMENTAIRES, in 3 ŒUVRES DE POTHIER 95-97 (3d ed. 1823). 
 137. PLANIOL, supra note 136, No. 2881, at 412; POTHIER, supra note 136, at 95-97. 
 138. MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 135, at 554. 
 139. PLANIOL, supra note 136, No. 2878, at 412. 
 140. Id. No. 2880, 2881, at 414. 
 141. TRASBOT  & LOUSSOUARN, supra note 135, at 270-72. 
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testator to make his will in their favor, such as services, good 
offices, caresses, flatteries, presents, the interpositions of 
persons who cultivate for them the good will of the testator, 
and engage him to make some bequest in their favor: for 
although these kinds of ways may be inconsistent either with 
decency or good conscience, or even contrary to both, yet 
the laws of men have not inflicted any penalties on those 
who practise them.142 
Of all of the ancient authors, however, Furgole appears to have 
been the most influential on the topic of captation.143 Writing in his 
treatise on testaments, Furgole argued that many of the other 
scholars had "gone too far in being satisfied with simple persuasion as 
constituting suggestion or in having declared suggested the 
dispositions made 'on the interrogation of another.'"144 Furgole took a 
much more restrictive view of captation and suggestion and 
concluded that captation and suggestion were simply specific types of 
fraud.145 Other types of influence were not actionable. 
By the time of the enactment of the French Civil Code, the 
grounds of captation, suggestion, and hatred as explicit bases for 
invalidating a will were eliminated.146 In his presentation to the Corps-
Législatif, Bigot-Préameneu explained the absence of captation and 
suggestion as follows: 
The law keeps silent on the defect in the liberty that can 
result from suggestion or captation, and about the vice of 
consent determined by anger or through hatred.  Those who 
have tried to annul the dispositions through similar motives 
have not hardly ever succeeded in finding sufficient proof . . . 
; and maybe it would be better for the general interest, that 
this source of ruinous and scandalous lawsuits would dry up, 
 
 142. 2 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER No. 3152, 341 (William 
Strahan trans. 1853). 
 143. TRASBOT & LOUSSOUARN, supra note 135, at 270-72. 
 144. Id. 
 145. JEAN-BAPTISTE FURGOLE, TRAITÉ DES TESTAMENS, CODICILES, DONATIONS A 
CAUSE DE MORT ET AUTRES DISPOSITIONS DE DERNIERE VOLONTÉ, in 1 ŒUVRES 
COMPLETTES DE M. FURGOLE 247 (1875) (citing Menochius). 
 146. See PLANIOL, supra note 139, No. 2878, at 413. In fact, if a testator had capacity, the 
code failed to provide for any grounds at all upon which consent could be vitiated, even the 
standard ones of fraud, violence, or error.  See id.  Be that as it may, the doctrine and 
jurisprudence concluded that the "general rules appl[ied]" and found wills to be annullable on 
grounds of error, fraud, and violence.  Id. No. 2879-2886, at 413-16.  See also infra note 256. 
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in declaring that the causes of nullity will not be 
admitted . . . .147 
Far from endorsing this kind of immoral behavior and influence over 
testators, Bigot-Préameneu explained that the new approach left the 
matter to the courts. He stated that "[i]t is the wisdom of the courts 
that can only appreciate these acts, and to hold the balance between 
the strength due to the acts and the interest of families; they prevent 
them from being robbed by greedy people who subjugate the 
dying."148 
In French law today, it is "[t]he ideas of Furgole [that] 
dominate," insofar as suggestion and captation are no longer 
independent grounds for annulling a will.149 It is only when such acts 
"present the character of fraud" and "'are accompanied by practical 
artifices or lying insinuations'" that they can serve as grounds for 
rescinding a will.150 Lies or fraudulent means are necessary to establish 
the kind of captation necessary to annul a will.151 Isolating a testator 
from his friends and family combined with deceptive techniques to 
procure a disposition can constitute fraudulent captation,152 as can lies 
regarding one's co-heirs in an effort to deprive them of a legacy.153 In 
such cases, captation can be found by examining the "totality of the 
circumstances," without need of particular fraudulent or deceptive 
acts.154 
As a supplement to the rather high level of deceptive conduct 
required by French law to annul a will, the French Civil Code, much 
like early Roman law, also provides a series of outright prohibitions 
on gifts in those cases in which suggestion, captation, or American-
 
 147. Bigot-Préameneu, M., Présentation au Corps Législatif et Exposé des Motifs, in 12 P.A. 
FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 521 (1968) 
(author's translation); see also A.  DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRANÇAIS, SUIVANT LE 
CODE CIVIL 330 (1834). 
 148. 12 FENET, supra note 147, at 521 (author's translation); see also DURANTON, supra 
note 147, at 330. 
 149. TRASBOT & LOUSSOUARN, supra note 135, at 270-72. 
 150. Id. 
 151. MAZEAUD ET AL, supra note 135, at 554-55. 
 152. Première chambre civile [Cass. 1e civ.], Oct. 30, 1985, Bulletin des arrêts de la Cour de 
cassation, chambres civiles [Bull. civ.] No. 282; MAZEAUD ET AL, supra note 135, at 554-55. 
 153. Cass. 1e civ., Oct. 28, 1895, 1896 DPG No. 1, 36; MAZEAUD ET AL, supra note 135, at 
545-55. 
 154. Cass. 1e civ., Feb. 11, 1976, Bull. civ. No. 65. But see Cass. 1e civ., Oct. 24, 2000, Bull. 
civ. No. 270 (holding that a son could not annul his mother's will made five days after leaving a 
clinic and in favor of the clinic director, unless he could show fraudulent maneuvers on the part 
of the director). 
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style undue influence are especially common (e.g., certain fiduciary 
relationships). For example, Article 909 provides that "[m]edical or 
surgical doctors, health officials, and pharmacists who treated a 
person during the illness that led to death, cannot profit from inter 
vivos or testamentary dispositions that were made in their favor 
during the course of this illness . . . .  The same rules will be observed 
with regard to ministers of worship."155 
The above blanket prohibition was seen as necessary because 
"the sick can be easily submissive to this doctrine in which he easily 
sees a savior to whom nothing could be refused."156 Moreover, "[a] 
physician who attends a sick person easily gains great influence over 
his mind, especially because the sick person expects from the 
physician a recovery and is often willing to make great sacrifices to 
obtain it."157 Thus, the prohibition is necessary not only for the 
protection of the sick but also for the doctor because it puts his 
practice "above any suspicion."158 The Civil Code is "rigorous" in 
imposing a presumption of captation that is irrebutable.159 The law 
does not allow debate into the merits of a particular disposition; all 
testamentary dispositions to such persons are forbidden.160 
The harshness of the above prohibition, however, is mitigated by 
the restrictive scope of its application.161 Rather than imposing a 
broad prohibition, the law precludes disposing only if three conditions 
are met. First, the relative incapacity applies only to the listed 
individuals, such as a doctor or at least one who performs the same 
function of "treating the sick," even though he may not possess the 
title.162 "The incapacities decreed by article 909 cannot be extended to 
other professions which are not enumerated."163 Legacies to nurses or 
masseuses are not covered by the above rule any more than a legacy 
 
 155. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 909 (author's translation). 
 156. MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 167. 
 157. PLANIOL, supra note 136, No. 2962, at 450. 
 158. Id. 
 159. MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 166 (author's translation). 
 160. Id. 
 161. The prohibition in article 909 of the Civil Code is subject to the following exceptions: 
(1) remunerative dispositions made under particular title, having regard for the faculties of the 
disposer and for services rendered; (2) universal dispositions in the case of relatives of the 
fourth degree inclusive, provided, however, the decedent did not have relatives in the direct 
line; unless he who profits from the disposition that was made is not himself one of the heirs. C. 
CIV. art. 909; see also MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 167. 
 162. MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 166-67. 
 163. Id. at 167 n.39 (quoting Chambres des requêtes [Cass. Req.] [chamber of requests], 
May 12, 1931, Recueil hebdomadaire Dalloz [DH] 1931, 348) (author's translation). 
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to a lawyer is because they do not "treat" the sick.164 Ascertaining 
what constitutes "treatment" is a matter that rests solely with the 
discretion of the juge du fond, but "the classification of these facts 
within the meaning of Article 909 is subject to review by the Court of 
Cassation."165 
A minister who attends a donor during his last illness is covered 
under the above article, but only if he "attended the decedent during 
his last illness by giving him what might be called spiritual treatment. 
If he only visited him as a friend, he does not fall under the statutory 
provision."166 Planiol indicates that pharmacists also are included 
because "these persons give less guarantee of honesty than graduated 
physicians, and also because their clientele usually comes from the 
less enlightened groups of the population."167 
Second, in addition to being a doctor or similar party, the doctor 
must have cared for the testator during his last illness and the gratuity 
must have been made at that time.168 Recent jurisprudence from the 
Cour de Cassation confirms that gifts to a donor are not stricken with 
nullity if the donor was treated by the beneficiary for an illness other 
than the one that caused death.169 Third, the decedent must have died 
during the illness. "If the sick person recovers, the gratuity is valid, 
although it could have been brought about by inducement. If it is a 
testamentary gratuity, it can be revoked . . . ."170 
Just as in French law, "in German law there is neither a specific 
legal provision nor even any particular legal term for undue 
influence . . . ."171 The German Civil Code, the Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch (BGB), deals with the problem of undue influence by 
refusing to enforce instruments or legal acts that "'contravene[] the 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS, § 649, 44-45, in 3 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 
(Carlos Lazarus trans. 1969). 
 166. PLANIOL, supra note 136, No. 2967, at 452. 
 167. Id. No. 2963 at 450.  The fear of undue pressure or influence in these relationships is 
also manifest in the French prohibition on enforcing "[d]ispositions inserted in a testament 
made in the course of a sea voyage for the benefit of officers of the ship other than relatives."  
C. CIV. art. 995. The "old adage," according to Planiol, is that "a commanding officer of a vessel 
is the master on the board, 'after God’"; thus "his possible influence must be feared just as that 
of physicians and priests."  PLANIOL, supra note 136, No. 2968, at 453. 
 168. MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 167. 
 169. Cass. 1e civ., July 1, 2003, D. 2003, 2404. 
 170. PLANIOL, supra note 136, No. 2964, at 451 n.118. 
 171. Armin Hadjiani, Duress and Undue Influence in English and German Contract Law: A 
Comparative Study on Vitiating Factors in Common and Civil Law, 2002 OXFORD UNIV. COMP. 
L. FORUM 1, 27 (2002), available at ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/hadjiani.shtml. 
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sense of decency of every person who possesses understanding for 
what is just and equitable'"172 Specifically, Section 138(1) of the BGB 
provides that a "legal transaction which is against public policy is 
void."173 This kind of prohibition is sometimes referred to as one that 
inquires into the "objective content" of the transaction.174 For 
example, when a testator attempts to impermissibly control the 
behavior of beneficiaries by providing that a legatee will receive an 
inheritance only if she "gets divorced" or "adopts a different faith," 
the content of the will runs afoul of Section 138(1) and risks at least 
partial invalidity.175 Thus, the German courts use Section 138 (1) "for 
establishing some measure of moral control over unscrupulous 
testators wishing to abuse the freedom of testation for purposes of 
which the law must disapprove."176 
Although Section 138(1) cannot be used to challenge any will 
that deviates from the intestate order of succession, it has been used 
to invalidate testamentary dispositions designed to exclude those 
entitled to a compulsory share or to recompense for an adulterous 
relationship.177 Historically, courts invalidated so-called paramour 
wills, whereby a spouse was excluded from a will in favor of a 
paramour, under this provision of German law. Modern law considers 
the motive of the testator and invalidates the dispositions only if the 
purpose is a meretricious one, rather than one for payment of 
household services.178 Some scholars have described the modern 
German approach under Section 138 as analogous to the French idea 
of "immoral cause."179 
 
 172. 1 E. J. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 277 (1968). 
 173. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 138(1). 
 174. See RAINER FRANK, ERBRECHT 92-104 (C.H. Beck 2005). 
 175. Id. But see BVerG FamRZ 2000, 945. 
 176. 1 COHN, supra note 172, at 277.  The immorality of the will is generally determined at 
the time of the making of the will, rather than the time of inheritance. See PETER GOTTWALD, 
DIETER SCHWAB & EVA BÜTTNER, FAMILY & SUCCESSION LAW IN GERMANY 125 (2001) 
(citing BayObLG FamRZ 1997, 656, 661). But see FRANK, supra note 174, at 52 (citing doctrinal 
sources arguing that the time of devolution is the appropriate time for assessing immorality). 
 177. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH], Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen 
[BGHZ] 53, 369 (1970). 
 178. See FRANK, supra note 174, at 49. See also GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 125. 
 179. 3 MICHEL FROMONT & ALFRED RIEG, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT ALLEMAND 
(REPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE) 297 (1991) ("Aujourd'hui, la jurisprudence est plus nuancée et peut 
être comparée avec les décisions françaises relatives à la 'cause immorale'.  Elle tient compte 
essentiellement de deux facteurs: la motivation du testateur, d'une part, les effects concrets de la 
disposition à cause de mort, d'autre part."). For a general explanation of the French concept of  
"illicit" or "immoral" cause, see generally PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS  & PHILIPPE 
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In German law, however, legal acts that are "contra bonos 
mores" extend further.  Section 138(2) of the BGB provides that a 
"legal transaction is void in which someone by exploiting the plight, 
inexperience, lack of discernment or significant weakness of will of 
another, causes to be promised or granted disproportionate pecuniary 
advantages to himself or to a third party in exchange for a 
performance."180 When a person "exploits his professional position of 
trust," he violates this kind of prohibition.181 Thus, when a doctor 
abuses his professional position to convince an elderly patient to 
leave him something in his will, a violation of Section 138 exists and 
the testamentary disposition is without effect.182 A legacy, however, 
that results from mere incessant importuning requests, without the 
testator being in a position of necessity or having a weakened will, 
does not violate Section 138(2).183 
Similarly, Section 134 of the BGB nullifies wills that violate 
statutory prohibitions.184 Most notably in this context, German law 
contains an explicit prohibition on the receipt of testamentary gifts by 
the managers or employers of nursing homes from their residents.185 
 
STOFFEL-MUNCK, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 293 (2004) (stating that "an obligation in 
which the cause is illicit is only null if the motives of the debtor are illicit"). 
 180. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [civil code] § 138(2) (author's translation). 
 181. FRANK, supra note 174, at 49. See also Jacques du Plessis, Threats and Excessive 
Benefits or Unfair Advantage, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: SCOTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVES 151, 161 (Hector MacQueen & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh Studies 
in Law 2006) ("The courts therefore expanded the illegality requirement of § 138(1) BGB to 
cover these cases that were analogous to those falling under § 138(2) BGB.  In addition § 138(1) 
BGB could be made to cover situations where disadvantageous contracts were concluded by 
economic inferior or pressurized parties, or by parties who had been subjected to undue 
solicitations.  In this way, German law could now also provide relief in situations comparable to 
those covered by the Common Law of undue influence."). 
 182. FRANK, supra note 174, at 49. 
 183. BGH, BWNotZ 1965, 348. 
 184. BGB § 134. German law provides that a "legal transaction which violates a statutory 
prohibition is void, unless the law provides otherwise."  Id.  This provision is equally applicable 
to wills, as it is to contracts and other legal transactions. See id.  The BGB, unlike the French 
Civil Code, is divided into five books, with "Successions" being the last. Even though Book V 
includes only sections 1922 to 2385, provisions contained in the General Part (Book I), including 
section 138, are applicable nonetheless. More specifically stated, "The rules on nullity of legal 
transactions as laid down in the first book of the Civil Code are in general applicable to wills."  1 
COHN, supra note 172, at 277. 
 185. Heimgesetz [HeimG] 1974 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGB1. I] art. 14 § 5 (F.R.G.).  
The Heimgesetz, however, applies only to nursing homes and not to doctors in general.  HeimG 
§ 1 (6) (exempting hospitals from the scope of the law).  Doctors, however, are subject to the 
provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which proscribe acceptance of gifts from 
patients if such gifts would interfere with independent (or create the impression of such 
interference) of their medical assessment.  See Muster-Berufsordnung Ärzte (MBO) § 32. 
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This prohibition, which is part of the Heimgesetz, was recently 
challenged as a violation of testamentary freedom under German 
law,186 as the German Basic Law (the Grundgesetz) guarantees not 
only the right of testamentary freedom through the basic freedom of 
"development of personality"187 but also through the right of 
inheritance.188 Section 2302 of the BGB further emphasizes the 
importance of testamentary freedom by providing that "a contract 
whereby a person binds himself to make or not to make, to revoke or 
not to revoke, a disposition in the event of death, is void."189 In 
evaluating this challenge, the German Federal Constitutional Court, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, sustained the constitutionality of the 
prohibition only after carefully weighing the public benefits achieved 
by the prohibition. The court noted that the prohibition achieves 
three main goals: (1) protecting financial exploitation of old and 
vulnerable people; (2) protecting the nursing homes from the risk of 
disparate treatment of residents due to financial influences; and (3) 
protecting the testamentary freedom of residents.190 The court noted 
that the protection granted to vulnerable home residents under 
Section 14 of the Heimgesetz has an even broader ambit than the 
general prohibition in Section 138 of the BGB, which exists only 
when there is coercive activity.191 In this context, the prohibition of 
testamentary gifts is an absolute and outright one. 
In short, although both German law and French law fail to 
provide explicit equivalents of undue influence in American law, both 
do maintain restrictions associated with certain types of incapacities 
or prohibitions that prevent many of the same instances of undue 
influence. Without more, the ambit of the civilian prohibition, which 
so far has been shown only to apply in certain confidential, fiduciary, 
or coercive situations, would be of much less scope—although greater 
strength—than the American concept of undue influence. Although 
no American jurisdiction establishes the type of outright prohibition 
on gifts to those in certain fiduciary arrangements that the civil law 
 
 186. 1 BvR, July 3, 1998, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfG] [German 
Federal Constitutional Court] 1998, 2964. 
 187. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law) (GG) BGB1.I, art. 2, I.  
The constitutionally guaranteed right of an individual to pass property to his successors has 
been judicially recognized as well.  See, e.g., 1 BvR, Apr. 19, 2005, BVerfG, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift [NJW] 2005, 1561. 
 188. GG art. 14. I. 
 189. BGB § 2302 (author's translation). 
 190. 1BvR, BVerfG, NJW 1998, 2964. 
 191. Id. 
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systems do, American undue influence covers some of the most 
common arrangements in which family members and strangers seek 
benefits under a will. To fully determine whether both traditions 
possess functionally equivalent restrictions, other potential 
prohibitions must be examined. 
B. Violence and Drohung 
Alongside the issue of undue influence, the concept of duress 
must be discussed.  In fact, in the American law of wills, the concepts 
of duress and undue influence are so intertwined that several major 
Trusts and Estates textbooks omit discussion of duress altogether192 or 
explain the idea only in connection with undue influence.193 Leading 
treatises explain that "duress is often classed under undue 
influence."194 And, in the context of wills, it "may be defined as the 
use of coercion or force to such a degree that it destroys the free 
agency and willpower of the testator."195 The Restatement is perhaps 
most helpful in distinguishing between duress and undue influence.196 
For an act to constitute duress under American law, it is clear that it 
must be a wrongful act that coerces the testator to make a disposition 
that he would not have otherwise made.197 In defining the types of acts 
that are "wrongful," the Restatement provides that the act must be 
either "criminal or one that the wrongdoer had no right to do."198 
Undue influence, on the other hand, may exist even in face of a threat 
to do a perfectly valid legal act. Thus, "a threat to abandon an ill 
testator" would not constitute duress, but it certainly may constitute 
undue influence.199 
Although French law and German law both contain concepts 
similar to duress, neither system maintains an exact analogue. French 
 
 192. See generally DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4; see also DOBRIS ET AL., supra note 
111; EUGENE F. SCOLES, EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., RONALD C. LINK & PATRICIA GILCHRIST 
ROBERTS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS (6th ed. 2000). 
 193. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MARY LOUISE FELLOWS & 
THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 4-59 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing duress under a section entitled 
"Undue Influence/Duress"). 
 194. PAGE, supra note 96, at 865. 
 195. Id. at 864. 
 196. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.3(b)-(c) (2003). 
 197. Id. § 8.3(c). 
 198. Id. § 8.3 cmt. (c)(i). 
 199. Id. 
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law maintains the idea that a will can be annulled for violence, but 
violence is broader than American duress.200 Some suggest that 
violence "should be thought of as 'undue pressure' rather than 
'duress' given the very wide range of situations which it includes."201 
The French Civil Code defines violence as that which inspires in the 
reasonable person fear of considerable and present injury to his 
person or fortune.202 The concept of violence includes, of course, 
physical violence against the testator and also threats against him, his 
property, or certain third parties (violence morale). Although physical 
violence directed toward a testator is rare for testaments by public 
act, the existence of moral violence may exist even in the presence of 
a notary and witnesses.203 "[C]ourts have taken a 'subjective view' to 
the question whether the fear which a threat causes is sufficient to 
satisfy violence, looking to see whether the particular person's 
consent was sufficiently affected by the legitimate threat, taking into 
account his or her 'force of character,' social position, age or sex."204 
For a threatened act to constitute violence, the threat must itself 
be illegitimate, such as a threat to do a criminal act.205 Threats to take 
acts one is legally allowed to pursue do not constitute violence and 
thus do not serves as grounds for annulling a will or a contract.206 For 
example, a threat to seek recourse to justice unless another repairs 
the damage caused does not constitute violence.207 But the 
jurisprudence walks a fine line in this area because a threat to seek 
justice against a thief, unless he gives twice the value of the object, 
may be grounds for invalidating an agreement.208 Strictly speaking, 
 
 200. JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 
320 (1998); see also Alain Levassuer, Les Maux des Mots en Droit Compare: L'Avant-Projet de 
Réforme du Droit des Obligations en Anglais at 31-33 (on file with author). 
 201. BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 320. 
 202. C. CIV. art. 1112. Age, sex, and the condition of the person are considered in evaluating 
the reasonableness of the fear.  See id. 
 203. Première chambre civil [Cass. 1e civ.] Apr. 13, 1956, Bull. Civ. I No. 153. 
 204. BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 321 (emphasis omitted) (citing A. BÉNABENT, 
OBLIGATIONS 56 (4th ed., Paris, 1994); J. FLOUR AND J.-L. AUBERT, ACTE JURIDIQUE 157-58 
(6th ed., Paris, 1994); F. TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 191 (5th ed., Paris, 
1993)).  See also C. CIV. art. 1112, ¶2. 
 205. ALAIN BÉNABENT, DROIT CIVIL – LES OBLIGATIONS 71 (10th ed. 2005). 
 206. PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS, & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, DROIT CIVIL : 
LES OBLIGATIONS 243 (2003). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 243 n.78.  See also BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 321 ("Here French law again 
relies on the idea of the 'abuse of rights,' so while in principle a threat to exercise a legal right is 
not violence, exceptions are made where either the means or the purpose of its exercise are 
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though, this kind of threat does not constitute violence, but rather 
abuse of right.209  In the words of the Cour de Cassation: 
The threat of the use of a legal remedy does not constitute 
violence in the sense of Articles 1111 et seq. of the Civil 
Code unless there is abuse of this remedy, be it by diverting 
its purpose, or by using it to get a promise or advantage 
without a connection or out of proportion with the 
original.210 
In any case, nullification results if the disposition is inspired either by 
violence or abuse of right.  These two ideas are so closely connected 
that the scope of their combined ambit precludes much of the 
unseemly conduct that the American concept of undue influence 
invalidates. 
Although the French law of violence sees its greatest application 
in the contractual realm, the doctrine applies equally to wills because 
"a testament calls for the identical quality of consent as a contract."211 
In fact, with regard to gratuitous dispositions such as inter vivos 
donations or wills, French law is more liberal in annulling dispositions 
from violence than in the context of onerous contracts, such as sales.212 
Sometimes, "a simple threat to abandon" a weak testator may very 
well constitute violence under French law.213 In the area of wills, the 
Cour de Cassation has decided that a will can be annulled when an 
old, weak, paralyzed testator is threatened that his care would not be 
continued unless a legacy is made to his caretaker.214 Similarly, 
sustained pressure from a nurse on an aged and gravely ill testator, 
who lived in fear of abandonment, can constitute grounds for 
annulling a will.215 Although reverential fear of a father, mother, or 
other ascendant, without more, is not enough to annul a testament,216 
"[i]f, however, reverential fear were joined with an intimidation 
resulting from threats, the contract would be susceptible of 
 
improper, for example, where a person threatens to bring a vexatious law suit or where he uses 
his right to obtain more than his due.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 209. VALÉRIE TOULET, DROIT CIVIL – LES OBLIGATIONS 49 (2007). 
 210. Troisème chambre civil [Cass. 3e civ.] Jan. 17, 1984, Bull. civ. III, No. 13. 
 211. CHRISTIAN JUBAULT, DROIT CIVIL, LES SUCCESSIONS, LES LIBÉRALITÉS 429 (2005). 
 212. MAULAURIE, supra note 134, at 148; GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT 
CIVIL: LES SUCCESSION ET LES LIBÉRALITÉS no. 374, at 288 (1983); MAZEAUD ET AL., supra 
note 135, at 554. 
 213. MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 212, no. 374, at 288. 
 214. Cass. civ., Jan. 27, 1919, JP 1920, 198 (Fr.). 
 215. Cass. 1e civ., July 7, 1965, Bull. Civ. I No. 463 (Fr.). 
 216. C. CIV. art. 1114. 
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annulment even if the threats were not by themselves of a gravity 
sufficient to invalidate the consent.  This would happen, for example, 
if a father, in order to compel the son to consent to a contract, 
threatened to dispose of all his property."217 Just as the concepts of 
duress and undue influence often blend together in American law, so 
too the ideas of violence and captation are linked.218 
The above prohibitions are not the only devices in French law 
that prevent undue influence in testaments. French criminal law also 
has a role to play.  In 2001, the French government enacted the crime 
of fraudulent abuse of weakness that protects the vulnerable from the 
psychological manipulation of others. Specifically, article 223-15-2 of 
the French Penal Code provides: 
the fraudulent abuse of a state of ignorance or a situation of 
weakness of a minor, or of a person whose particular 
vulnerability, due to his age, sickness, infirmity, a physical or 
mental condition or to a pregnancy, which is apparent or 
known to the offender, or abuse of a person in a state of 
physical or psychological dependency resulting from the 
exercise of serious or repeated pressure or from techniques 
used to affect his judgment, in order to induce the minor or 
other person to act or abstain from acting in any way 
seriously harmful to him, is punished by three years' 
imprisonment and a fine of € 375, 000.219 
This law, commonly called the About-Picard law after the 
legislators who drafted it,220 was passed originally to apply to cults and 
to prevent brainwashing.221 A recent decision of the Cour de 
Cassation, however, has expanded its scope. In 2005, the criminal 
chamber of the Cour de Cassation found that a wife who obtained a 
testamentary bequest, power of attorney, and other assets from her 
old and weak husband who suffered from mental trouble had violated 
article 223-15-2 of the Penal Code.222 The court sentenced the wife to 
12 months suspended imprisonment and a fine of € 3000.223 Given the 
 
 217. AUBRY & RAU, supra note 165, at 316. 
 218. MARTY & RAYNAUD, supra note 212, at 288; MAZEAUD ET AL., supra note 135, at 554. 
 219. Code Pènal [C. Pèn.] art. 223-15-2 (author's translation). 
 220. Law No. 2002-504 of June 12, 2002, Journal Officiel de la Republique Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], June 13, 2002, p. 9337. 
 221. Id. The title of the law indicates its purpose is to "reinforce the prevention and 
repression of sectarian movements that infringe on human rights and fundamental liberties." Id. 
 222. Chambre Criminelle [Cass. Crim.], Nov. 15, 2005, JCP 2006, II, No. 15, p. 10057; See 
also MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 155. 
 223. Cass. Crim., Nov. 15, 2005, JCP 2006, II, No. 15, p. 10057. 
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newness of this criminal prohibition, it is uncertain how broadly the 
courts will interpret it in the future.  Recent jurisprudential decisions, 
however, suggest its scope extends outside its original purpose. 
Similarly the German concept of Drohung "throws the net more 
widely" than the American concept of duress.224 The BGB provides 
that a testamentary disposition can be challenged if a testator makes a 
disposition because of threats (Drohung).225 As with violence in 
French law, most cases of Drohung occur in the contractual context, 
but the testamentary prohibition in 2078 of the BGB is the same as 
the general prohibition of Drohung in the contractual realm.226 
Drohung under German law can exist in three different contexts.  
"A threat is unlawful if first, the means of threatening is illegitimate, 
or secondly the end (the desired result) is objectionable, or thirdly, 
the particular connection between means and end makes the threat 
appear unlawful."227 An example of an unlawful means (Mittel) is the 
classic case of a threat to do something prohibited by the criminal 
law, such as physical violence.228 Even the threat to breach a contract 
can be unlawful.229 An illegitimate end (Zweck) exists when the 
intended result of the threat is illegal.230 Thus, when a threat violates a 
statutory provision—in contravention of BGB § 134—or concerns an 
act contrary to good morals—in violation of BGB § 138, an illegal 
Drohung exists because its end is illegal.231 Finally, an unlawful 
means-end relation (the Mittel-Zweck Relation), which has the most 
significance in succession law,232 can occur when, for example, a 
housekeeper threatens to quit in order to provoke a testamentary 
disposition in her favor.233 In such a case, the relationship between the 
 
 224. See F. H. LAWSON, THE RATIONAL STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW 58 (1951) (comparing 
German and English law).  See also Hadjiani, supra note 171, at 17 (also comparing German and 
English law). 
 225. BGB § 2078(2). 
 226. KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Band 1, 1544 (C.H. Beck 2003); 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Band 6, 1544 (C.H. Beck 
1989); 3 FROMONT & RIEG, supra note 179, at 307. 
 227. SIR BASIL MARKESINIS, HANNES UNBERATH, & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE GERMAN 
LAW OF CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE 317 (2d ed. 2006). 
 228. See id. 
 229. Hadjiani, supra note 171, at 11. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.  The usefulness of this version of Drohung is unclear, as sections 134 and 138 
already invalidate such a contract.  See id. 
 232. MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Band 6, 1544 (C.H. 
Beck 1989). 
 233. FRANK, supra note 174, at 98. 
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means employed (i.e., the threat) and the end sought (i.e., the legacy), 
is illegitimate.234 "The general rule is that where the means of the 
threat and the end are intimately connected, the pressure is lawful; 
and where they are not related to each other, the pressure may be 
unlawful."235 While simple intrusive requests for a legacy are 
themselves not illegal,236 the exploitation of a testator's weakened will, 
such as a threat by a caregiver to abandon a needy testator, may 
violate the prohibition on Drohung.237 
The reasons for the different scopes of the concepts of duress, 
violence, and Drohung seem to be historical. Historically, "Common 
Law, in the narrower sense, treated as 'duress' only those cases in 
which a person made a promise under threats of physical violence or 
imprisonment. The concept of 'undue influence,' gradually developed 
by the Courts of Equity, is used for the cases which are dealt with 
under the concept of duress in the Continental civil codes."238 
Although this has changed somewhat today, the purview of American 
undue influence still occupies much the same realm of the French 
concept of violence and the German idea of Drohung. 
C. Capacity 
As previously discussed, the issues of undue influence and 
testamentary capacity are "inextricably linked."239 Medically speaking, 
"[t]he lower the capacity or cognitive status of an individual, the less 
influence would be required to determine that the individual was 
incapable or unduly influenced. Conversely, an individual with only 
mild impairment of cognitive function would have to be subjected to 
a severe level of influence to the point of coercion or containment 
before that influence would be considered undue."240 Courts take 
cognizance of this medical reality, and thus the nullifying ambit of 
undue influence is inversely related to the quality of testator's 
capacity. In fact, as argued above, given the minimal standards of 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. MARKESINIS ET AL., supra note 227, at 317. 
 236. BGH, RG Recht 1910, 1395; BGH, BWNotZ 1965, 348. 
 237. See THEODOR KIPP, ERBRECHT, 167-68 (1990) (citing a decision from the RG 
27.10.1902). KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Band 1, 1544 (C.H. Beck 2003); 
MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, Band 6, 1544 (C.H. Beck 
1989); 3 FROMONT & RIEG, supra note 179, at 307. 
 238. ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 131, at 428. 
 239. Shulman et al., supra note 2, at 722. 
 240. Id. at 723-24. 
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capacity to make a will, undue influence is often used to invalidate a 
will made by one who meets the low threshold of capacity but 
obviously is not sufficiently voluntarily disposing of his assets.  Higher 
standards of testamentary capacity, as often exist in foreign systems, 
make the protective function of undue influence less necessary. 
"In the [American] law of wills, the requirements for mental 
capacity are minimal,"241 but capacity has both quantitative and 
qualitative elements. In quantitative terms, one must possess a certain 
quantity of years or reach a certain age before one is able to make a 
will.  In almost all states the age necessary to make a will is 18.242 
Below that age, one is considered to be a minor and thus suffers from 
an incapacity due to minority.243 Irrespective of the quality of a 
minor's capacity, the quantitative lack of sufficient age makes one 
incapable of making a will. 
Although the above quantitative requirement is a necessary 
element of capacity to make a will, it is not a sufficient one. In 
addition to the quantitative element, a qualitative requirement also 
exists. Sometimes the qualitative component of capacity to make a 
will is described as being of "sound mind."244 To be "of sound mind," 
a testator "must be capable of knowing and understanding in a 
general way the nature and extent of his or her property, the natural 
objects of his or her bounty, and the disposition that he or she is 
making of that property, and must also be capable of relating these 
 
 241. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 141.  In fact, some have characterized the 
allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of testamentary capacity as "a crazy quilt of 
apparently conflicting and confusing maxims and principles which vary from state to state in an 
astounding variety of verbal formulae."  ROSS & REED, supra note 3, § 6:14 at 6-67. 
 242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 196, § 8.2(c) (2003) ("The age of 
majority is 18, unless an applicable statute provides otherwise."). Id. § 8.2 cmt. (b) (stating that 
"at common law the age of majority was 21," but most states have lowered the age to 18 by 
statute); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 ("An individual 18 or more years of age who is 
of sound mind may make a will."); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 141 n.1 ("In almost all 
states the age of majority is 18."). Historically a male of 14 years of age or a female of 12 could 
make a will concerning personalty. DECEDENTS' ESTATES, supra note 76, at 11. "This limitation 
seems to have been derived from the canon law, which was natural, since ecclesiastical courts 
had jurisdiction in probate matters. . . ." Id. This rule was done away with in England in 1838 
and an age limitation of 21 was imposed on all for the making of a will concerning either realty 
or personalty. Id. 
 243. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 196, § 8.2 (c) ("A minor does not 
have capacity to make a will.  A purported will made by a minor is void."). Although an 
emancipated minor may be able to make a will under the law of a particular state, the "law 
regarding emancipation is not uniform throughout the United States nor well-developed" and 
thus will not be discussed here as a general exception to the quantitative capacity requirement 
to make a will. See id. § 8.2 cmt. (i). 
 244. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501. 
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elements to one another and forming an orderly desire regarding the 
disposition of the property."245 
"The statement is sometimes made that it takes less mental 
capacity to make a will than to enter into a contract. There is a 
semblance of truth in this declaration."246 Some suggest the reason for 
this differential is that it takes less mental fortitude to make a 
unilateral donative act than to engage in a bilateral one that requires 
bargaining and opposing points of view.247 Thus, in American law, 
"[a]n incapacity to contract may coexist with the capacity to make a 
will."248 Scholars have noted that testamentary capacity is "universally 
regarded in Anglo-American authorities as the lowest."249 In fact, one 
court has even noted that "[a] lunatic may draw a valid will."250 
The above fact is somewhat surprising because the standard for 
contractual capacity is not a high one. In fact, capacity to contract is 
presumed, unless the party falls within the limited class of those 
designated as not having capacity.251 The Restatement of Contracts 
makes the minimal standard quite clear: "A natural person who 
manifests assent to a transaction has full legal capacity to incur 
contractual duties thereby unless he is (a) under guardianship, or (b) 
an infant, or (c) mentally ill or defective, or (d) intoxicated."252 
Some commentators have criticized the comparison of 
contractual capacity with that of testamentary capacity because the 
two are "so different in their nature that it is impossible to use one as 
 
 245. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, supra note 196, § 8.1(b). 
 246. ATKINSON, supra note 86, at 240 (citation omitted). 
 247. See, e.g., id. 
 248. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-11(b) (2008).  See also 10 GA. JUR. DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS § 1:29 (1999) ("However, since the degree of mentality necessary to make a contract is 
higher than that necessary to make a will, a person with a mental capacity less than that 
required to make a contract may have the requisite degree of mental capacity to make a valid 
will.").  Incapacity to contract requires that "there must be an entire loss of understanding. . . .  
For one who has not strength of mind and reason equal to a clear and full understanding of his 
act in making a contract is one who is afflicted with an entire loss of understanding."  Higgins v. 
Trentham, 197 S.E. 862, 865 (Ga. 1938).  See also Lewis H. Parham, Jr. Wills and Contracts—
Degree of Mental Capacity Required for Each, 34 N.C. L. REV. 155, 156 (1955) (stating that "[a] 
number of other courts have held that less mental faculty is required for making a will than for 
executing any other instrument"). 
 249. John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 
82 (1978). 
 250. Skelton v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); see also Langbein, 
supra note 249, at 82-83. 
 251. 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (1981). 
SCALISE__FMT5.DOC 11/19/2008  3:19:20 PM 
2008] UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE LAW OF WILLS 77 
a test for measuring the other."253 Be that as it may, numerous court 
decisions in multiple jurisdictions state "that testamentary capacity 
requires a lower degree of mental capacity than contractual or 
business capacity."254 As difficult as it may be to compare the capacity 
standards for wills and contracts, the test for capacity in the making of 
wills is an issue to be decided by a jury. Despite the amorphous 
definition of testamentary capacity, it has been held that no error 
exists when the jury is told that a lower degree of mental capacity is 
necessary to make a will than to make a contract.255 
Like the law of the United States, French law maintains both 
requirements of age and mental quality before one can execute a will. 
French law requires that one be of sound mind (sain d'esprit) before 
one can execute a testament256 but begins with a presumption that all 
persons, except those considered incapable, can dispose of property 
by testament.257 Unlike American law, which generally requires one to 
be 18 before being able to make a will, French law recognizes a 
limited capacity for unemancipated minors 16 years old to make wills 
that dispose of half the amount of their property that they could 
dispose as if they were of majority.258 
In France, the qualitative aspect of capacity has historically been 
a complex one. Prior to the enactment of the French Civil Code, the 
Coutume de Beauvaisis in Northern France provided that "[n]o legacy 
is valid unless it is made by a person of sound mind and memory, and 
unless he says it aloud."259 Even in the eighteenth century it was clear 
that the capacity standard for making a will was greater than that 
 
 253. PAGE, supra note 96, § 12.20 at 674. 
 254. Id. at 672-73 (citing cases from Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, New York, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).  In fact, some 
commentators have noted that jurisdictions, such as Connecticut, which require the same 
capacity to make a will as to make a contract, "demand much more from a testator than the 
majority of American jurisdictions."  ROSS & REED, supra note 3, § 6.2, at 6-16 n.8. 
 255. Gable v. Rauch, 27 S.E. 555, 558-59 (S.C. 1897). 
 256. C. CIV. art. 901.  In addition, in 2006, the French amended the law of successions to 
make clear now that a donation or testament is also null when consent is vitiated by error, fraud, 
or violence. C. CIV.art. 901, amended by Law No. 2006-728 of June 23, 2006, J.O., June 24, 2006, 
art. 10 ("Pour faire une libéralité, il faut être sain d'esprit. La libéralité est nulle lorsque le 
consentement a été vicié par l'erreur, le dol ou la violence."). 
 257. C. CIV. art. 902. 
 258. Id. art. 904.  Minors below the age of 16 can dispose of property only in favor of spouses 
and children.  See id. arts. 903, 1095. 
 259. THE COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISIS OF PHILIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR No. 370 135 (F.R.P. 
Akehurst, trans., 1992).  Although it is unclear whether the will or a mere statement of capacity 
had to be "sa[id] . . . aloud."  See id. at 153 n.4. 
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necessary to enter an ordinary contract.260 D'Aguesseau's Ordinance 
on Wills provided that to make a will required "a wisdom less 
equivocal, a reason more clear, and will more firm that that necessary 
for a contract."261 
At the time of codification, it was somewhat surprising that a 
specific code article in the Title on Liberalities provided that to have 
capacity to make a gift or testament one had to be of sound mind.262 
Although the content of the rule was not surprising, the existence of 
the article was. After all, "Wasn't sound mind necessary for all 
acts?"263 Nonetheless, the article was approved because it is 
"especially for gratuitous dispositions that a freedom of mind and a 
plentitude of judgment are necessary."264 Moreover, during the last 
moments of life, when one often makes a testament, there is increased 
risk of sickness and greater danger of "traps on the part of those who 
surround" a testator.265 
Even after codification, the testamentary capacity standard was 
not clear. The French scholar, Toullier, in his early work on the Civil 
Code, writes that sanity is always presumed and insanity is never 
presumed.266 Although the Code originally provided only that an 
individual must be "of sound mind" to execute a donation or will, 
some argued that the standard of capacity for donations was higher 
than the standard for onerous contracts.267 When the Cour de 
Cassation rejected this argument, it became clear that the mental 
 
 260. MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 146. 
 261. Id. at 146  n.1  (quoting d'Aguesseau). 
 262. 12 FENET, supra note 147, at 579-80. 
 263. Id. (author's translation) (stating "[c]et article a d'abord causé quelque surprise.  Ne 
faut-il pas être sain d'esprit pour tous les actes?"). 
 264. Id. (author's translation). 
 265. Id. (author's translation). In fact, historical evidence reveals that in the discussions of 
the Council of State on this general capacity article, there was concern about a proposed second 
part of this article 504, which provided that just as for contracts, attacks on a disposition after 
death could be made only in limited cases, namely, when the instrument evidence a mental 
problem or when an action was instituted during the life of the disposer or at least proceedings 
for guardianship were so initiated. Id. at 296-97. Although the ability to challenge wills after 
death was not clear even after codification, the Court of Cassation in 1810 eliminated all doubt 
that article 504 did not apply to testaments and thus they could be challenged without restriction 
after the death of the testator.  Id. at 296-97.  See also 3 C.-B.-M. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS § 56, 43-44 (1846). 
 266. 3 TOULLIER, supra note 265, § 56, at 44 (stating that advanced age of the donor, 
forgetting his family, the importance of the legacy, and the low quality of the legatee are not 
sufficient for the judge to determine that the testator did not have capacity). 
 267. Cass. Req. Feb. 12, 1886, 1868, 1, 389. 
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standard required for both types of acts was the same.268 Still, Planiol, 
writing in the early twentieth century, stated that although all legal 
acts require capacity, the standard for donations and wills "is 
particularly exacting."269 In 1968, however, the legislature ended all 
debate by enacting Article 489 of the Civil Code, which unequivocally 
stated that the standard necessary to enter into any legal act is that 
one be "of sound mind"—the very same standard necessary for the 
execution of a will.270 
In France, proof of incapacity is left to the solemn discretion of 
the juge du fond. The heavy reliance on judges to ascertain capacity 
has been clear since the time of the enactment of the French Civil 
Code.  In his presentation of the civil code to the legislative assembly, 
M. Bigot-Préameneu stated that "[i]t is sufficient to state the general 
principle [that sound mind is required to execute a will] and to leave 
great liberty to the judges in the application of this principle."271 
Similarly, the German requirements for testamentary capacity, as 
in France and unlike the United States, are equal to the standard 
necessary to contract, at least in terms of mental quality.272  In terms 
of age, only those older than sixteen can make a will.273 "Before 
reaching this age, a minor cannot make a will even with the consent of 
his legal representative. On the other hand, once he has reached the 
age of 16, he can make a will without obtaining the consent of his 
legal representative."274 This relaxed quantitative requirement is 
limited by the rule that a minor, even one over 16, cannot make an 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. PLANIOL, supra note 139, No. 2872, at 409. 
 270. See C. CIV. arts. 489, 901. MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 146.  For a historical overview 
of the issue of contractual and testamentary capacity in French law, see Odile Simon, La Nullité 
des Actes Juridiques Pour Trouble Mental, 73 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL [REV. 
TRIM. DR. CIV.] 707 (1974).  Now the only distinction in terms of capacity is the ease in which 
donative transactions can be challenged after the death of the testator. See C. CIV. art. 489. 
 271. 12 FENET, supra note 147, at 518. See also id. at 580-81 (M. Jaubert, Communication 
Officielle au Tribunat) (stating that because it is impossible for the law to establish fixed and 
positive rules for all circumstances, the matter should be left to the discretion of the court). 
 272. GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 126 (stating that the provision for testamentary 
capacity in § 2229(4) "corresponds to § 104 No. 2"). 
 273. BGB § 2229. German wills are generally of two types: (1) self-made or (2) public wills.  
See BGB § 2231. Other exceptional types of emergency wills are allowable under German law.  
See, e.g., BGB §§ 2249-2251.  Self-made wills are those written, signed, and dated by the testator 
himself.  See BGB § 2247.  Minors may not make self-made wills.  BGB § 2247(4). 
 274. Dennis Solomon, The Law of Succession, in INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 271, 
280 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2d ed. 2005) (citation omitted). 
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olographic will.275 Such a prohibition exists to eliminate the possibility 
of undue influence.276 
Although a presumption of testamentary capacity exists in 
German law, the qualitative standard requires more than merely 
knowing of the existence of the will and its contents.277 The BGB, 
however, does not provide an affirmative definition of qualitative 
capacity. Instead, it must be inferred from the articles that provide for 
the absence of capacity.278 A person cannot make a will if "because of 
diseased defect of mental capacity, due to imbecility or impaired 
consciousness[, he] is incapable of realizing the significance of a 
declaration of intention made by him and of acting with this 
understanding"279 A testator must understand the scope and effect of 
the testament on the economic and personal circumstances of those 
receiving under it.280 Similarly, the standard for contractual capacity in 
Book I of the BGB is that a person is incompetent to enter into legal 
transactions who suffers from "a diseased disturbance of mental 
capacity preventing the free exercise of his will, unless the condition is 
by its nature a temporary one."281 This rule of Geschäftsfähigkeit is the 
standard for both contractual and testamentary capacity. "Those who 
lack contractual legal capacity are also incapable of making a will."282 
In conclusion, the American capacity standard for making a will 
is often characterized as lower than that for contracting, but the law in 
France and Germany requires a mental ability equal to that of 
contractual capacity to make a will. If the law on the books is to be 
believed, a number of people without contractual capacity who would 
be precluded from making wills in France and Germany are able to 
do so in America, although definitive proof of such a comparative 
observation is difficult indeed. The American doctrine of undue 
influence fills the void between contractual capacity and testamentary 
capacity. In the words of one scholar, "the lower the mental capacity 
of the testator, the easier it is to convince a jury or court of the 
 
 275. BGB § 2247(4). 
 276. KIPP, supra note 237, at 118. 
 277. Kammergericht [KG] [Provincial Court of Appeal for Berlin] Sept. 7, 1999, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 903, 2001 (F.R.G.). 
 278. NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 376-77 (3d ed. 
2002). 
 279. BGB § 2229(4) (author's translation). 
 280. Id. 
 281. BGB § 104 (author's translation). 
 282. GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 126. 
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existence of undue influence."283 Because the standard for 
testamentary capacity seems higher in France and Germany than it is 
in America, the need for a broad, flexible doctrine to prevent those of 
weakened mental constitution from making wills is not as important 
in those legal systems. 
D. Family Protection Devices 
"As American inheritance law embarks upon a new millennium, 
the scope offered for freedom of testation remains as broad as it has 
ever been, and it is now indeed a scope without parallel elsewhere in 
the western world. Here, and, here alone, a testator of sound mind 
can disinherit even minor children at will . . . ."284 In the sense of 
limiting testamentary freedom, undue influence and family protective 
devices serve the same basic function. That is, forced heirship and 
systems of community marital property serve the same function as the 
undue influence of restricting excessive impecunious gifts outside the 
family and protecting the natural recipients of the testator's bounty. 
Some scholars have even noted that by virtue of America's broad 
concept of undue influence, the concept of testamentary freedom is a 
"myth[]."285 
For example, if A has an estate of $10,000, and the applicable law 
mandates 50% of A's estate devolve to his spouse and children, then 
a will leaving all of A's assets to his mistress and none to his family is 
subject to challenge for violating the requisite family protective 
scheme.  Family members entitled to a compulsory share are less 
likely to challenge the will for grounds such as undue influence 
because other legal devices already guarantee them a certain share of 
the estate. Without a family protective device and under a system of 
completely free testation, undue influence becomes one of the few 
ways in which a disappointed heir can challenge a will.  In short, the 
greater and more significant the family protective scheme is, the less 
necessary a doctrine like undue influence will be. 
 
 283. Frolik, supra note 110, at 85. 
 284. Adam J. Hirsch, American History of Inheritance Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL 
HISTORY 23 (2008).  Despite this ability to "disinherit" children, some studies indicate that a 
majority of Americans think that parents should not be able to "disinherit their children nor to 
discriminate among them."  MARVIN B. SUSSMAN, JUDITH N. CATES, & DAVID T. SMITH, THE 
FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 206 (1970) (based on a survey of 860 adults in Nebraska). 
 285. See, e.g., Madoff, supra note 101, at 629. 
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1. Forced Heirship 
First and perhaps most obviously, civil law systems have forced 
shares that prevent the total disinheritance of close relatives, such as 
children. "All modern legal systems in Europe attempt to balance the 
moral precept of family solidarity with the principle of freedom of 
testation."286 The protective role served by forced heirship achieves 
the same result as undue influence by preventing disinheritance of 
close relatives. In fact, in the 1990s when Louisiana curtailed its 
conception of forced heirship, the state legislature enacted for the 
first time the concept of undue influence as "necessary to protect 
those who had previously enjoyed the protection of forced 
heirship."287 
Although the idea of forced heirship can be traced to Roman 
law, the law of the XII Tables provided individuals with almost 
unfettered testamentary freedom.288 While Roman law granted a 
testator the power to disinherit relatives, he had to disinherit certain 
relatives expressly, using the correct form.289 Forced heirship seems to 
have been originally an idea of the praetor who would grant bonorum 
possessio in spite of the provisions of the ius civile and in spite of a 
testator's failure to specifically institute certain relatives as heirs.290 As 
disinheritance became more popular in the late Republic, the querela 
inofficiosi testamenti developed whereby close relatives who were 
excluded by the will could challenge the will as undutiful. Thus, the 
passing over of nearby relatives in favor of farther away ones or mere 
friends was not looked upon favorably and was subject to challenge 
by the passed-over heir under the querela.291 Over time, the querela 
was broadened and could be invoked by disappointed heirs not only 
for the total exclusion from a will but also for a testator's failure to 
leave an heir at least "a quarter of the estate under the will," as 
required by the Lex Falcidia.292 Justinian, however, returned the 
 
 286. Reinhard Zimmermann, Compulsory Heirship in Roman Law, in EXPLORING THE 
LAW OF SUCCESSION, supra note 8, at 27. 
 287. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Aftermath of the "Revolution": 1990 Changes to the New 
Forced Heirship Law, 51 LA. L. REV. 469, 487-88 (1991). 
 288. See XII Tables, Table V (c. 450 B.C.E.), in 1 THE CIVIL LAW 66, 66-67 (S. P. Scott ed. 
& trans., 1932). See also Zimmermann, supra note 286, at 30. 
 289. See G. INST. 2.123-124, in THE CIVIL LAW (S. P. Scott ed. & trans., 1932). 
 290. See DIG. 38.2.3.10 (Ulpian, Edict 41). 
 291. ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 62-63 
(1971). 
 292. See DIG. 35.2.1.pr. (Paulus, On the Lex Falcidia). 
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querela to its old foundation and limited its application to only those 
who suffered total exclusion.293 
The querela is sometimes characterized as a challenge for lack of 
sound mind, insofar as the testator must have been of unsound mind 
to exclude such relatives.294 In fact, Marcian, quoted in the Digest, 
states that the querela inofficiosi testamenti is brought on grounds that 
the testator was of "unsound mind," but by that it is not meant that 
the testator was a lunatic or without capacity but merely that the "will 
was correctly made but without due regard for natural claims."295 
After all, "soundness of mind" was required for the making of a will 
and thus a will made by a party without capacity would be subject to 
challenge on that ground.296 
In France, the Roman idea of the pars legitima or the legitime 
"was well established in most districts of southern France by the year 
1100."297 And by the mid-sixteenth century the leading appellate court 
in northern France, the Parlement of Paris, "declared that the 
'légitime' had been accepted as a part of local usage and incorporated 
in the Custom of Paris."298 Although the laws regarding the legitime 
still varied among regions,299 at the time of codification "this form of 
limitation was accepted without question as part of the national 
heritage."300 The Roman approach was modified, however, insofar as 
 
 293. See J. INST. 2.18.3. 
 294. See J. INST. 2.18.pr. 
 295. DIG. 5.2.2 (Marcian, Institutes 4). 
 296. See DIG. 28.1.2 (Labeo, Posthumous Works, Epitomized by Javolenus, Book 1) ("In 
the case of someone who is making a will, at the time when he makes the will, soundness of 
mind is required, not health of body."); DIG. 5.2.2 (Marcian, Institutes 4). In early Roman law 
there was no mechanism to protect heirs against an individual making excessive gifts while alive 
and thus depleting his estate.  "It was not until the end of the classical period that, by analogy 
with the querela inofficiosi testamenti . . . , the querela inofficiosae donationis . . . was formulated 
for the purpose of contesting the validity of excessive gifts."  O. E. Tellegen-Couperus, Some 
Remarks Concerning the Legal Consequences of the Querela Inofficosiae Donationis, 26 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITÉ 399, 399 (1979). 
 297. JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW 
COMPARED 41 (1980). See also Joseph Dainow, Forced Heirship in French Law, 2 LA. L. REV. 
669, 670 (1940) ("[I]n the country of the written law there existed the institution of the légitime 
in practically the same form as it had been known to the Romans."). 
 298. DAWSON, supra note 297, at 41. The pays de droit coutumier differed from the pays de 
droit écrit in at least two different ways: (1) the notion of family ownership of property and (2) 
the concern for "the nature and source of property." See Dainow, supra note 297, at 672. 
 299. 12 FENET, supra note 147, at 245 (Présentation au Corps Législatif et Exposé des 
Motifs, par M. Bigot-Préameneu) ("Il faut distinguer en France les pays de droit écrit et ceux de 
coutume."). 
 300. DAWSON, supra note 297, at 42. 
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it provided a reserve of an individual's estate that the testator could 
not give away rather than a guaranteed share that the heirs must 
receive.301  After much debate and discussion,302 the final articles of the 
Civil Code provided that if a decedent died with children he could 
gratuitously dispose of one half of his property if he had only one 
legitimate child; one third, if two children; and only one-fourth, if 
three or more.303 If he died without children, but with ascendants, he 
could gratuitously dispose of only one-half of his property if he had 
ascendants in both the maternal and paternal lines, and three-fourths, 
if he had ascendants in one line only.304 Despite criticism of forced 
heirship,305 the institution remained virtually unchanged until 2006 
when the French Civil Code was amended to eliminate ascendant 
forced heirship.306 The institution, however, is preserved for 
descendants. 
Similarly, German law contains a system of forced heirship 
(Pflichtteil). Although the principle of freedom of testation is 
enshrined both in the German Civil Code and the German 
Constitution, limitations on free testation exist.307 "One of the most 
important limits to the testator's freedom is presented by the 
statutory forced share" of certain close relatives, who are entitled to a 
guaranteed minimum share of the decedent's estate.308 Under German 
law, a testator's descendants, parents, and spouse are entitled to a 
"compulsory portion" of the testator's estate, even if they are 
excluded from the testator's will.309 "Pursuant to §2309 BGB, 
however, descendants and parents do not receive a forced share if 
under the rules of intestate succession they would have been excluded 
 
 301. Id. at 47. 
 302. See generally 12 FENET, supra note 147 (Présentation au Corps Législatif et Exposé des 
Motifs, par M. Bigot-Préameneu); Dainow, supra note 297, at 679-82. 
 303. C. CIV. art. 913. 
 304. Id. art. 914. 
 305. 3 AMBROSE COLIN & HENRI CAPITANT, COURS ÉLEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS  no. 930, 759-61 (1945). For a recent comparative assessment of forced heirship in the 
laws of France and Greece, see IOANNA KONDYLI, LA PROTECTION DE LA FAMILLE PAR LA 
RESERVE HÉRÉDITAIRE EN DROITS FRANÇAIS ET GREC COMPARÉS (1997). 
 306. Law No. 2006-728 of June 23, 2006, J.O., June 24, 2006, art. 12.  For an overview of the 
changes in the recent revisions to the succession law of France, see generally Législation 
Française: Réforme des Successions et des Libéralités, 3 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
CIVIL 612 (2006); ALAIN DELFOSSE & JEAN-FRANÇOIS PENIGUEL, LA RÉFORME DES 
SUCCESSIONS ET DES LIBÉRALITÉS (2006). 
 307. See, e.g., BGB § 2302. 
 308. Solomon, supra note 274, at 273. 
 309. BGB § 2303. 
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from inheriting because of the presence of closer relatives or relatives 
of a lower order."310 Consequently, parents have no right to a forced 
share if children exist, and children also exclude claims of more 
remote descendants to the forced share.311 The compulsory portion for 
blood relatives and spouses "is supplemented by § 10 VI LPartG 
which grants a forced share also to the decedent's life partner."312 
A forced heir excluded from a will is not, per se, treated as an 
"heir," but is instead considered to be a creditor of the estate for the 
requisite amount of the inheritance pursuant to the law of 
obligations.313 The amount of the compulsory portion is equal to half 
the intestate share that a relative would have received.314 Thus, if A 
has two children, B and C, and A's will leaves his $100,000 estate to 
his friend, X, then B and C collectively have a claim to their 
compulsory share of $50,000, or half their intestate share.315 "Where 
such a person is not entirely disinherited by the testator, but 
appointed as heir with a testamentary share lower than the forced 
share, he may claim a 'supplementary' forced share (Zusatzpflichtteil) 
under § 2305 BGB."316 
The German commitment to a forced share is strong. Not only 
are preferred heirs guaranteed a share of the decedent's property at 
death, but if the decedent attempts to frustrate the statutory forced 
share by transferring assets out of his estate prior to death, the law 
allows the forced heirs to recapture their value.  That is, "§ 2325 BGB 
grants the right to an augmented forced share 
(Pflichtteilsergänzungsanspruch) where the testator ha[s] made gifts 
to third persons within the last ten years before his death."317 
Although German courts have softened the application of the 
Pflichtteil in some cases,318 the Constitutional Court has been clear 
 
 310. Solomon, supra note 274, at 290. See also BGB § 2309 ("Entferntere Abkömmlinge und 
die Eltern des Erblassers sind insoweit nicht pflichtteilsberechtigt, als ein Abkömmling, der sie im 
Falle der gesetzlichen Erbfolge ausschließen würde, den Pflichtteil verlangen kann oder das ihm 
Hinterlassene annimmt."). 
 311. See Solomon, supra note 274, at 290. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. See also GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 137. 
 314. See GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 138. 
 315. See BGB § 2303(1). 
 316. Solomon, supra note 274, at 290. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 24, 2005, 23 Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift [NJW] 1650 (1651), 2005 (F.R.G.) (holding that a son who beat and killed his 
mother could legally be deprived of his compulsory share, despite being found not guilty by 
reason of insanity). See also Thomas Rauscher, Recent Developments in German Succession 
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that mere "estrangement" of a child and his parent is not sufficient 
grounds to deprive him of his compulsory share.319 
Recently, the German Federal Cabinet proposed revisions to the 
compulsory share in German law that would strengthen testamentary 
freedom. For purposes of this article, the main revisions are 
broadened allowances for disinherison of forced heirs and a new 
calculation that reduces the amount of donations made during a 
decedent's life that are added back.320 Be that as it may, the German 




2. Community Property 
While "[t]he institution of forced heirship provide[s] descendants 
with some protection against total disinherison at the whim of the 
parent, . . . the spouse [i]s offered protection by community 
property . . . ."321 In fact, some have referred to such spousal rights 
under matrimonial property law as "Ersatz" or "substitute" 
inheritance laws.322 Although perhaps an overstatement insofar as 
community property laws are not mandatory requirements, 
community property laws do "encourage the performance of a 
spouse's social duty to protect financially his surviving spouse after he 
dies by allowing a surviving spouse to claim a fraction of property 
acquired during the marriage. . . . This encouragement takes the 
 
Law 4-5, report at the 17th Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law, 
Utrecht (July 16-22, 2006), http://www2.law.uu.nl/priv/aidc/PDF%20files/IIA1/IIA1%20-
%20Germany.pdf. 
 319. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfg] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 11, 2005, 37 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2691 (2691), 2005 (F.R.G.). See also Rauscher, supra 
note 318, at 5. 
 320. Press Release, Bundesministerium der Justiz, Pflichtteilsrecht soll reformiert werden, 
Mar. 16, 2007, available at http://www.bmj.bund.de/. 
 321. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Cythina Picou, Cynthia Samuel, & 
Frederick W. Swaim, Jr., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable "Revolution", 50 
LA. L. REV. 409, 453 (1990). 
 322. van Erp, supra note 8, at 11 (citing Maria Puelinckx-Coene, Possible Follow-Up to the 
Conference by the Committee of Experts on Family Law, ¶ 5, delivered to the Sixth European 
Conference on Family Law, Doc. No. CONF/FA (2002) RAP GEN (Oct. 15, 2002), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co%2Doperation/family_law_and_children%27s_right
s/conferences/2ConfFam6th.asp). 
SCALISE__FMT5.DOC 11/19/2008  3:19:20 PM 
2008] UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE LAW OF WILLS 87 
form . . . of decreased transaction costs."323 The transaction costs are 
obvious by virtue of the need to affirmatively opt out of a community 
regime if one seeks to avoid its rules. "That is, a community property 
regime, along with its ancillary spousal protection, exists by virtue of 
marriage, without need for further documentation or legal 
proceedings. Those electing to avoid their social duties must incur the 
increased transaction costs involved in varying from the default rule 
and in choosing a separate property regime."324 
All but nine states in the United States have regimes of separate 
property that do not afford spouses the protection of community 
property regimes.325 In fact, the common law tradition is generally not 
accustomed to the community property regime.326 Many of the nine 
states in the United States that maintain a form of community 
property trace their origins to the civil law. In the other 41 states, 
however, marriage, in terms of property ownership, produces much 
the "the same [effect] as if they were not married at all."327 
The origins of community property systems are obscure. 
Historically, "[t]he community property system originated in 
continental Europe in countries where both spouses worked together 
in tandem—either in warrior tribes, like the Visigoths (in which the 
husbands conquered enemies and the wives stripped them of the 
spoils of war) or as farmers and herders (in which both spouses 
worked to raise crops and animals)."328 In other words, community 
property regimes implement a "partnership" theory of marriage and 
thus provide a way to recognize the contribution of both spouses to 
the success of the family unit. 
 
 323. Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too Far 
in Protecting Parents, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 171, 198-99 (2006). 
 324. Id. at 199. 
 325. See Andrea B. Carroll, The Superior Position of the Creditor in the Community 
Property Regime: Has the Community Become a Mere Creditor Collection Device?, 47 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1, 1 n.3 (2007) ("Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Texas, and Washington have long been community property states. . . Wisconsin became the last 
American state to adopt a marital property regime that is considered 'community' with its 
enactment of the Wisconsin Marital Property Act—heavily based on the Uniform Marital 
Property Act—in 1986."). This is not to suggest that spouses in the United States receive no 
protection against disinherison.  For further development of this point, see infra note 361. 
 326. Alain Verbeke et al., Current Developments: European Marital Property Law Survey 
1988-1994, 3 EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE LAW 445, 447-48 (1995). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Cynthia A. Samuel & Katherine S. Spaht, Fixing What's Broke: Amending ERISA to 
Allow Community Property to Apply upon the Death of a Participant's Spouse, 35 FAM. L.Q. 
425, 428 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
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In France, a community property regime is standard, although 
the ability to elect a designated property regime is great.329 The Civil 
Code "sets out a number of standard regimes, which may be adopted 
as drafted or adapted to individual circumstances, including 
separation of property, deferred community of property, universal 
community of property and community of after-acquired property."330 
The community regime of after-acquired property is the "legal regime 
(régime legal) and "applies automatically to a marriage unless the 
spouses opt for different arrangements in a formal marriage contract 
drawn up and authenticated by a notary (notaire)."331 Under this 
regime, all property acquired during the marriage is owned jointly by 
both spouses in the marriage, irrespective of in whose name the 
property is titled.332 As a consequence of joint ownership during life, 
at the death of one spouse, the surviving one has an automatic right to 
one-half of the community property acquired during marriage, with 
the other half belonging to the decedent and thus passing to his heirs. 
Some have described the foundation of French community property 
as one based on "collaboration" and an "association of interests" 
rooted in the idea of family harmony333 and thus not strikingly 
different from the American [community property] approach . . . ."334 
In France, it is estimated that only about 10% of spouses opt out of 
the standard legal regime of community property by virtue of a pre-
nuptial agreement and usually only when "large and important assets 
are involved."335 
The French regime of separate property is also much like the 
separate property regime that prevails in most of the United States.  
Each spouse owns and administers his own property and is 
 
 329. For an overview of French marital property law, see A. Colomer, The Modern French 
Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY: A SYMPOSIUM AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL FACULTY OF COMPARATIVE LAW AT LUXEMBOURG ON THE LAWS OF 
BELGIUM, ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE NETHERLANDS 80 (Albert Kiralfy 
ed., 1972); ANDRÉ COLOMER, DROIT CIVIL: RÉGIMES MATRIMONIAUX (5th ed. 1992); RÉMY 
CABRILLAC, DROIT CIVIL: LES RÉGIMES MATRIMONIAUX (6th ed. 2007). 
 330. BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 254. 
 331. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 332. Id. at 255.  Gifts and inheritances to one spouse, however, remain separate. Id. 
 333. Michael McAuley, The Wanting of Community Property, 20 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 57, 
68 (2005). 
 334. Id. at 69. 
 335. Veronique Chauveau & Alain Cornec, France, in FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 251, 261 
(Carolyn Hamilton & Alison Perry eds., 2d ed. 2002). See also CABRILLAC, supra note 329, at 
113 n.1 (estimating that 83% of couples do not have a marriage contract). See also id. at 273 n.5 
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responsible only to his own creditors, not those of his spouse.336 At the 
death of one spouse or upon civil dissolution of the marriage, only 
property titled in the name of each spouse belongs to him separately 
and passes to his heirs. Thus, the death of an income-earning spouse 
under a regime of separate property threatens to leave the surviving 
spouse in a financially difficult position. 
In an attempt to ameliorate the precarious position of the 
surviving spouse in a separate property regime, French law maintains 
a number of spousal protection devices. Article 767 of the Code Civil 
provides that "[t]he succession of the predeceased spouse owes 
support to the surviving spouse entitled to succeed who is in need."337 
After the death of one spouse, this support is owed by all heirs, and 
even in some cases by particular legatees.338 Although Article 767 is 
new,339 prior law provided the same rights.340 
Unlike in the United States, French courts have historically 
taken a flexible approach to the kind of compensation owed to a non-
income earning spouse married under a regime of separate property. 
In different contexts, courts have used the concepts of unjust 
enrichment, formation of a business association, and denial of 
revocation of a donation as ways to compensate a non-income 
earning spouse who worked in the home or in the other spouse's 
business.341 Although election of a separate property regime is not 
common, when spouses enter a prenuptial agreement, they choose a 
separate property regime over 60 percent of the time.342 The other 
types of standard and individualized regimes are outside the context 
of this article and are generally not relevant in the practical 
application of marital property law.343 Collectively, they are "little 
used"; the "deferred community" arrangement, for example, is used 
only in "3 per cent of marriage contracts."344 In short, the standard 
legal regime—the one that applies to "all but a few"—is that of a 
community of after-acquired property. 
 
 336. BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 255. 
 337. C. CIV. art. 767 (author’s translation). 
 338. Id. 
 339. See Law No. 2001-1135 of Dec. 3, 2001, J.O., Dec. 4, 2001, p. 19279. 
 340. PIERRE MURAT, DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 895 (2008) ("Cette pension existait déjà 
auparavant à l'article 207-1 du Code civil."). 
 341. BELL ET AL, supra note 200, at 255-56. 
 342. Id. at 255. 
 343. For further detailed discussion of the remaining types of matrimonial property regimes 
in France, see COLOMER, DROIT CIVIL, supra note 329, at 511-607. 
 344. BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 256. 
SCALISE__FMT5.DOC 11/19/2008  3:19:20 PM 
90 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:41 
Similarly, three different marital property regimes are available 
in Germany. Although spouses are generally free to choose either a 
separate (Gütertrennung) or community (Gütergemeinschaft) 
property regime, the standard de fault regime is one of community of 
accrued gains (Zugewinngemeinschaft).345 Under the first regime, 
spouses can decide, via a notarized agreement, to preserve the 
individual separate status of property owned and acquired during 
marriage.346 Under this regime, each spouse owns and manages his 
own property.347 Pensions, however, will still be split, unless it is 
expressly agreed otherwise.348 Second, spouses can contract for a 
community regime in which all property owned or acquired during 
the existence of the marriage is owned jointly by the spouses.349 As a 
result spouses must generally concur in the management and 
alienation of community assets.350 Although the regime of community 
property does not include a spouse's separate property or his 
nontransferable rights (i.e., Sondergut or special property), it does 
encompass property owned by the spouses at the time the community 
regime is created.351 Finally, "[w]here—as in the majority of cases—no 
such agreement is made, the statutory regime of community of 
accrued gains . . . will apply, as well as pension splitting."352 Despite its 
name, the "community of accrued gains" regime actually preserves 
the separation of spouses' property during marriage. The importance 
of this regime, however, is that it limits one spouse's power to dispose 
of certain assets during the marriage.353 Moreover, at the dissolution 
of the marriage either through divorce or death, an equalization of 
assets must occur.354 The exact amount of the equalization depends 
upon what other relations of the deceased exist. If children exist, the 
spouse is entitled to a forced statutory share of one quarter and an 
additional one-quarter of the estate as equalization of accrued 
gains.355 On the other hand, if the decedent's parents rather than 
 
 345. See GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 107.  For an overview of the marital property 
system in Germany, see FOSTER & SULE, supra note 278, at 467-68. 
 346. BGB § 1414. 
 347. See GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 108. 
 348. Id. 
 349. BGB § 1416. 
 350. Id. §§ 1423, 1427, 1450, 1455. 
 351. Id. §§ 1416-1418. 
 352. See GOTTWALD ET AL., supra note 176, at 107. 
 353. BGB §§ 1365-1369. 
 354. Id. §§ 1363, 1371-1372. 
 355. Id. §§ 1371(1), 1931(1). 
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children survive, the surviving spouse is entitled to three-fourths of 
the estate.356 Although the German system, like the French, presents 
spouses with a number of different matrimonial property regimes, the 
community of accrued gains, which affords spousal protection, is the 
most common. 
As different as the general approach of French and German law 
is from the American marital property system, American law has 
made strides in recent times toward spousal protection in an effort to 
duplicate the treatment that the surviving spouse receives under a 
community regime. Although historically the protection for the 
surviving spouse was minimal,357 today all but one of the separate 
property states in the United States maintain an elective or forced 
share provision, which allows an omitted or disinherited spouse to 
claim against a will and receive a portion of the decedent's property.358 
Although the kinds of rights granted to a surviving spouse differ 
greatly by state,359 the most recent revision to the Uniform Probate 
Code, which has been adopted in many states, grants an escalating 
percentage interest of ownership to the surviving spouse in the 
 
 356. Id. §§ 1371(1), 1931(2). 
 357. At common law, a surviving spouse had either a right of dower, if a widow, or curtesy, 
if a widower, which granted to the spouse either a life estate in one-third of the husband's land 
or possession of the wife's land provided a child was born of the marriage, respectively.  
ATKINSON, supra note 86, at 105-06. As late as 1953, Atkinson writes that "[d]ower [and to 
some extent curtesy] as essentially at common law exist[] in a substantial number of American 
jurisdictions." Id. at 107. 
 358. Georgia is the lone exception.  Even Georgia, however, grants the surviving spouse and 
children a right of support and maintenance for one year after the deceased spouse's death. See 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3-1 - 53-3-5 (1996 & Supp. 2005). As salutary a protective measure as 
elective share statutes are, the protection afforded by elective share provisions has historically 
been an inadequate representation of the protective measure of community property regimes. 
Elective-share statutes have also been roundly criticized as inadequate protective devices in 
other contexts.  See, e.g., Samuel & Spaht, supra note 328, at 429-30. Professors Samuel and 
Spaht argue that 
[t]he greatest failure of full implementation of the partnership theory . . . occurs 
upon the death of the non-earning spouse . . . who outside of the community 
property states is not an owner of the acquisitions accumulated during the marriage 
by her supposed partner [and therefore] has no interest in the marital property to 
dispose of to her legatees or heirs.  If she dies before the earning spouse does, she 
has nothing to show for her years of devoted service to the economic partnership. 
Only community property consistently recognizes marriage as a true economic 
partnership from creation to its termination whether at divorce or at death. 
Id. at 430. 
 359. Although some states grant a full 50% ownership interest in the decedent's property to 
the surviving spouse, others grant only a life estate in one-third of the decedent's property.  See, 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §45a-436(a) (West 2004). 
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decedent's property that equals 50% after 15 years.360 Thus, after 
fifteen years, a surviving spouse in a separate property state will have 
elective share rights that match the property interest of a surviving 
spouse in a community property state. The rationale for the revised 
elective share approach is that the efforts of each spouse contributed 
to the success of the other and thus each is entitled to economic 
rights—as a partner—in the property of the other.361 
In short, the protective roles of community property and forced 
heirship are important ones. While neither forced heirship nor 
community property is designed primarily to protect a testator from 
improvident dispositions of his property, by restricting testamentary 
freedom, both achieve that ancillary effect. Restrictions on 
testamentary freedom necessarily mean that the decedent has less 
property of which he can dispose. Thus, the incentive to influence a 
testator unduly is reduced. 
IV. COMPARATIVE LESSONS 
After having evaluated the history, role, and problems of undue 
influence and the corresponding institutions in the civil law that 
achieve similar functions, the comparative lessons derived from the 
above must now be examined. In this modest contribution, the 
suggested lessons are of two types. 
First, in any comparative analysis, there are lessons to be learned 
not only about the substance of the analysis, such as the intricacies of 
undue influence, but also about the method of the analysis itself. That 
is, the first comparative observation is one about the importance of 
the methodology of comparative law, which is often criticized for 
being nonexistent, lacking sufficient structure, or for remaining an 
"unanswered" question.362 Second, the comparative exercise is useful 
 
 360. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 & 2-203 (amended 2006). 
 361. See id. art. II, pt. 2, general cmt. Other, less significant, protections for the surviving 
spouse exist as well.  For example, almost all estates allow a surviving spouse and any children 
to be awarded the family home and a certain portion of the decedent's tangible personal 
property.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, 476-77. All states also have "statute[s] authorizing 
the probate court to award a family allowance for maintenance and support" for a fixed period 
of time. Id. at 477. Federal Social Security benefits and private pensions governed by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 (1998), 
also either mandate payment to the surviving spouse at the death of the other spouse or strongly 
encourage survivorship rights for the decedent's spouse, as in the case of ERISA-governed 
pensions.  See generally  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 473-75. 
 362. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 1 
(1974). 
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for an obvious reason: in studying one's own law along with the laws 
of other jurisdictions, one learns not only about foreign law but "gains 
valuable insights into his own law."363 
A. Lessons for Comparative Law 
In an attempt to ascertain what lessons the above analysis offers 
for the methodology of comparative law, it is important to bear in 
mind that the degree to which the substantive rules of different 
systems achieve the same result is sometimes overstated. Finding 
differences in approach can sometimes be just as important as finding 
similarities.364 As Alan Watson has stated, "Comparative Law cannot 
be primarily a matter of drawing comparisons."365 Instead, 
"Comparative Law is about the nature of law, and especially about 
the nature of legal development."366 The nature of law and the nature 
of legal development have repeatedly shown themselves to be 
connected intimately with procedure. "By asking how one legal 
system may achieve more or less the same result as another legal 
system without using the same terminology or even the same rule or 
procedure, the comparatist is pushed to appreciate the 
interrelationships between various areas of law, including especially 
the relationships between substantive law and procedure."367 Some 
have even suggested that "the outcome of cases . . . is in practice more 
likely to be affected by procedural rules than by any niceties of 
substantive law."368 
Although the importance of procedure is an obvious historical 
point, its role is sometimes overlooked in the comparative analysis 
involving substantive legal institutions and rules. The reason is 
perhaps obvious: procedural law is often "[p]erceived as painstaking, 
ministerial, and ultimately boring."369 Its technical nature makes it an 
"unattractive candidate for comparative study" and seems to be 
 
 363. Lord Bingham, Foreword to MARKESINIS, supra note 227, at v. 
 364. See Dannemann, supra note 132, at 418 ("Those engaged in comparative enquires are 
generally well advised to look for both difference and similarity.  The purpose of the enquiry 
will be the most important factor in determining where one should primarily look for difference, 
where for similarity, and where for both in equal measure."). 
 365. WATSON, supra note 362, at 4. 
 366. Id. at 7. 
 367. Reitz, supra note 132, at 621-22. 
 368. Jeremy Lever, Why Procedure is More Important than Substantive Law, 48 INT'L & 
COMP. L.Q. 285, 285 (1999). 
 369. Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 8, at 1327, 1328. 
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"dreaded by students and avoided by professors who had higher 
aspirations."370 However, the risk of ignoring procedural law is great. 
Considering substantive legal institutions in a procedural vacuum 
runs the risk of underappreciating the importance, or lack thereof, of 
the substantive institution itself. 
The cognitive separation between substantive law and 
procedural law is most obviously a concern for the continental lawyer 
where, in France for example, there is a Code civil for substantive law 
and a separate Code de procédure civile for procedural law.371 
Similarly, in Germany, there is a Zivilprozessordnung for the 
adjectival law and a Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch for German substantive 
law.372 Although substance and procedure were intimately joined in 
the classical Roman legal mind,373 today, "[c]ivil-law countries are 
familiar with a clear-cut distinction between substantive rules and the 
forms of process."374 
The common law, however, is a law of remedies. And a law of 
remedies is, or at least was, a law of procedure. Historically, 
procedural and substantive law were so intertwined in English law 
that it was difficult to study and understand the one without the 
other. In the time of the early common law, for a plaintiff to succeed 
on his substantive claim, he had to select the appropriate procedural 
form of action that would merit the issuance of a writ, first "directed 
to the sheriff"375 and then to a royal court to institute judicial 
proceedings to investigate and resolve the matter. The wrong 
procedural writ meant that the case could be dismissed.  In fact, "right 
up to the nineteenth century the English common was still 
administered in the framework of the ancient writs."376 Patrick Glenn 
summarizes the importance of studying common-law procedure even 
today: "[Y]ou can't really understand a common law tradition without 
understanding the[] broad outlines and function [of the writ system]. 
 
 370. Id. 
 371. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, EUROPEAN LAW IN THE PAST AND THE FUTURE 48 (2002). 
 372. Id. 
 373. On the importance of legis actiones, which entailed selecting the right of action before 
the praetor with ultimate resolution of the issue before a iudex, see PETER STEIN, LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS 25-30 (1984). 
 374. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 371, at 48. 
 375. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 356 (5th ed. 
1956). 
 376. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 371, at 50. 
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They were all there was; outside the writs, there was no common law, 
no way to state a case or get before a judge."377 
The importance of the procedural law is not merely historical, 
and in modern times the role of procedural or adjectival law is 
essential in any comparative analysis. Although the above discussion 
has proceeded with only a minimal discussion of procedure, the 
reasons are ones of style and clarity of presentation. The issue of 
undue influence is as connected with procedural rules as are other 
branches of the substantive law. Two aspects of procedural law in 
particular—one in civil law and other in common law—merit 
discussion. 
First, one important procedural device that exists in civil law 
systems but not—at least not to the same extent—in common law 
ones is the existence of the civil law notary. The civil law notary is an 
office, largely unknown to the common law, whose notaries are "frail 
imitation[s] of [their] European counterpart[s]."378  European notaries 
hold public offices;379 their numbers are regulated by law;380 and they 
require extensive legal education, rigorous examination, and 
specialized training.381 French notaries must generally obtain a 
maîtrise en droit, a one year Diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées 
de droit notarial, and two years of apprenticeship.382 In Germany, the 
office of notary is obtained only after an extensive training period of 
three years as an assistant notary (Notarassessor).383 
 
 377. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 229-30 (3d ed. 2007). 
 378. Langbein, supra note 249, at 70. For more on the differences between American and 
civil law notaries, see RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, HANS W. BAADE, PETER E. HERZOG, & 
EDWARD M. WISE, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES—TEXT—MATERIALS 21-26 (6th ed. 1998). 
 379. Ordinance No. 45-2590 of Nov. 2, 1945, J.O., Nov. 3, 1945, p. 7160, art. 1; 
Bundesnotarordnung [BNotO] [Federal Act on Notary Publics] Feb. 13, 1937, 195, as amended, 
§ 1. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has recently reaffirmed the public nature of 
the notarial office in a decision that entertained complaints to the application procedure.  
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG], Sept. 20, 2002, docket number 1 BvR, 819/01, available at 
http://www.beck-online.de. 
 380. BNotO § 4. See also L. Neville Brown, The Office of the Notary in France, 2 INT'L & 
COMP. L.Q. 60, 62 (1953). 
 381. See Reina, supra note 93, at 441-42. See also Brown, supra note 380, at 62; JEAN 
YAIGRE & JEAN-FRANÇOIS PILLEBOUT, DROIT PROFESSIONNEL NOTARIAL 165-66 (3d ed. 
1991) (stating that notaries in Germany serve the same function in their country as notaries in 
France). 
 382. See BELL ET AL., supra note 200, at 73. See also YAIGRE & PILLEBOUT, supra note 381, 
at 25-30. 
 383. FOSTER & SULE, supra note 278, at 98.  For background on the German notary, see 
Christian R. Wolf, Notaries in Germany, in KEY ASPECTS OF GERMAN BUSINESS LAW: A 
PRACTICE MANUAL 277-86 (Michael Wendler et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006). See also BNotO §§ 3, 5, 
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Moreover, civil law notaries serve a variety of legal functions 
including drafting and authenticating documents and providing legal 
advice.384 Notaries provide important procedural protections in the 
drafting of some wills, which must be done before a notary to be 
valid.  Although many wills are holographic and thus are valid even 
without the imprimatur of a notary, the will authenticated by a civil-
law notary benefits from an "extremely strong (although nominally 
rebuttable) presumption of validity" and is thus very difficult to 
challenge.385 Professor Langbein has noted the importance of the 
notary in ensuring testamentary capacity, and this role is equally 
important in protecting against undue influence.386 Without 
overstating the role of the notary, it should be kept in mind that the 
notary "is a legally qualified and experienced officer of the state who 
is obliged to satisfy himself of the testator's capacity [and free 
consent] as . . . precondition[s] for receiving or transcribing the 
testament."387 
Far from merely validating signatures, a French notary must not 
only authenticate documents but also serve as a "disinterested 
counselor" of the parties.388 Similarly, German notaries must "provide 
independent and impartial counsel to the concerned persons,"389 
which includes an "obligation to examine the motives of the parties, 
clearly explain the facts of the matter to them, inform them of the 
legal ramifications of their desired transaction and, upon having done 
 
7.  In instances in which the office of notary and lawyer are combined, five years as an attorney 
is required. Id. 
 384. Reina, supra note 93, at 436-41. 
 385. Langbein, supra note 249, at 65-66, 70.  Under French law, a notarial testament has the 
probative force of an authentic act.  MALAURIE, supra note 134, at 250. Under the French Civil 
Code, an authentic act constitutes "full proof" ("pleine foi") of its contents.  C. CIV. art. 1319. 
Similarly, under German law, public wills are those made by "notarial writing by which the 
testator declares to the notary his last will or hands over to him a document with a declaration 
that the writing contains his last will."  BGB § 2232.  Such wills, when opened and read by the 
probate court, constitute "total proof of the transactions documented."  German Code of Civil 
Procedure § 415(1), in GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN 
ENGLISH 299 (Charles E. Stewart trans., 2001) [hereinafter German Code of Civil Procedure].  
For the procedure of the opening and reading of the will in court, see BGB § 2260.  They are 
"presumed to be genuine" and the party seeking to attack them bears the burden of proof.  
German Code of Civil Procedure, supra, § 437(1), at 303. 
 386. See Langbein, supra note 249, at 65. See also Kipp, supra note 237, at 120 (citing 
Beurkundungsgesetz [BeurkG] [Notarial Authentication Act] Aug. 28, 1969, BGBl. I at 1513, § 
28 (F.R.G.)). 
 387. Langbein, supra note 249, at 65. 
 388. Law of Mar. 16, 1803, J.O., Aug. 20, 1944, p. 137. 
 389. BNotO § 14(1). 
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so, to protocol their statements clearly and unambiguously."390  
French and German notaries must also make sure that the parties 
avoid mistakes as to the significance of the transaction and to "make 
sure that inexperienced and/or unsophisticated parties are not 
disadvantaged."391 False certification of documents by notaries is a 
violation of the criminal law.392 Although notaries in Germany are 
generally not allowed to refuse their services to anyone with a "valid 
reason,"393 a notary shall not participate in a transaction, such as a 
will, that requires certification of his own affairs or that of spouses or 
close relatives.394 Similarly, in France, notaries may not receive acts, 
such as wills, that involve certain close relatives or those that involve 
dispositions in their favor.395 
On the other hand, American law generally requires a witness to 
a will, but there is no requirement that a will be notarized.  To create 
an effective will under American law, there generally must merely be 
a signed writing that is witnessed by at least two competent 
individuals.396 Although the Uniform Probate Code did spur the 
creation of "self-proved" wills, which do require some notarization, 
the significance of the notarization differs from the civil law 
requirement.  First, although a testator may in some states execute a 
combined attestation clause and self-proving affidavit,397 more states 
allow the notarized self-proving affidavit to be executed only after the 
will is signed and witnessed.398 The goal of this self-proving procedure 
is not to prevent fraud and undue influence but primarily to prevent 
 
 390. Wolf, supra note 383, at 279. See also BeurkG § 17(1). See generally 
BUNDESNOTARKAMMER, Public Notaries in Europe—Bearers of Public Office (2001); ROLF 
GAUPP, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NOTARIAL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR 
CLIENTS, COLLEAGUES, AND THE STATES 120-47, available at http://www.bnotk.de/_PDF-
Dateien/22.UINLKongress1998Baire s/Congress_Buenos_Aires_1998_englisch.pdf. 
 391. Wolf, supra note 383, at 279. See also BeurkG § 17(1); Brown, supra note 380, at 69 
(referring to the French notary as "the protector of the interests of the inexperienced and 
legally incapable"). 
 392. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] May 15, 1871, § 348. See also Oberlandesgericht 
[OLG] [Trial Court for Selected Criminal Matters and Court of Appeals] June 16, 2003, 40 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2912, 2004 (F.R.G.). 
 393. BNotO § 15(1). 
 394. BeurkG § 3. 
 395. Decree No. 71-941 of Nov. 26, 1971, J.O., Dec. 3, 1971. 
 396. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502. Of course, holographic wills in the testator's own 
handwriting are also generally allowed and do not require witnesses. See id. § 2-503. 
 397. See id. § 2-504(a). 
 398. See id. § 2-504(b). See also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 245. 
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challenges to the will based on the signature requirement.399 
Compliance with the execution requirements other than the signature 
is only "presumed subject to rebuttal without the testimony of any 
witness."400 Also, by contrast to the substantive role played by his civil 
law counterpart, the notary in the United States serves only an almost 
perfunctory administrative function.401 In fact, ethical rules preclude 
the notary from acting otherwise. Guiding Principle VI of the Notary 
Public Code of Professional Responsibility specifically states that 
"[t]he Notary shall act as a ministerial officer and not provide 
unauthorized advice or services."402 
Furthermore, the witness requirement for American wills does 
not serve the same function as the notarial requirement in the civil 
law. Although notarization by an interested notary in the civil law 
would be unthinkable, under American law, "[t]he signing of a will by 
an interested witness does not invalidate the will or any provision of 
it."403 The comments to the Uniform Probate Code make clear that 
"[i]nterest no longer disqualifies a person as a witness, nor does it 
invalidate or forfeit a gift under the will."404 The Uniform Probate 
Code claims that the allowance of interested witnesses "does not 
increase appreciably the opportunity for fraud or undue influence" 
because a substantial legacy to a witness would presumably be a 
"suspicious circumstance" that would give rise to an undue influence 
suit.405 Moreover, the comments acknowledge the cleverness of undue 
influencers who usually exercise such influence and then procure 
disinterested individuals to sign as witnesses.406 Although interested 
witnesses are allowed, it is generally the rule that the lawyer who 
drafted the will cannot be a legatee, except in special circumstances.  
Rule 1.8 (c) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that 
 
 399. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-406(b), § 3-406 cmt. ("If the will is self-proved, 
compliance with signature requirements for execution is conclusively presumed. . ."). 
 400. Id. § 3-406(b). 
 401. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 225 (1984) (holding that a Texas statute that prohibited 
aliens from becoming notaries violated the Fourteenth Amendment). In Bernal, the Court 
stated that "[w]e recognize the critical need for a notary's duties to be carried out correctly and 
with integrity. But a notary's duties, important as they are, hardly implicate responsibilities that 
go to the heart of representative government. Rather, these duties are essentially clerical and 
ministerial." Id. 
 402. THE NOTARY PUBLIC CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Guiding Princ. VI 
(Nat'l Notary Ass'n, 1998). 
 403. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-505. 
 404. Id. § 2-505 cmt. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
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"[a] lawyer shall not . . . prepare . . . an instrument giving the lawyer 
or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer 
or other recipient of the gift is related to the client."407 
Second, the existence of a number of American procedural 
mechanisms creates incentives for undue influence suits in the United 
States, which do not exist in the civil law. It is somewhat surprising to 
learn that despite the frequency of allegations of undue influence, 
statistical evidence indicates that challenges to wills on grounds of 
undue influence are "consistently rejected" by courts.408 Logically, the 
failure rate of most "undue influence" suits should serve as a 
deterrent to the filing of a suit, given the cost of doing so and the low 
probability of success. This disincentive also exists in English law, 
which maintains a doctrine of probate undue influence similar to the 
American concept of undue influence and permits challenges to wills 
based upon suspicious circumstances. There, the disincentive has 
successfully served to preclude suits, as "the probate version of undue 
influence has been accurately described as a 'dead letter,'"409 and 
challenges to wills based on suspicious circumstances "seem[] to have 
generated few reported cases in recent years."410 
Given the similarity in English and American common law 
systems, one would expect to find a similarly sparse number of undue 
influence claims in America, but such is not the case. In the United 
States, undue influence remains the most common ground for 
attacking a will.411 The most likely reason is that a number of 
incentives for suing exist in American law outside of the merits of the 
litigation itself. As demonstrated above, issues of capacity and undue 
influence are inextricably intertwined. In fact, many claims for undue 
 
 407. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (6th ed. 2007).  Violation of this rule, 
however, does not automatically invalidate the will, although a challenge for undue influence is 
likely.  Instead, it merely subjects the lawyer to sanctions for ethical violations. See also MODEL 
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5 (prohibiting lawyers from naming themselves as 
legatees, except in exceptional circumstances); RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§208(2) (prohibiting such conduct except when "[t]he lawyer is a relative of the client and a 
natural object of the client's generosity"). For further elaboration on this issue, see William M. 
McGovern, Jr., Undue Influence and Professional Responsibility, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
643 (1994). 
 408. Schoenblum, supra note 3, at 647. 
 409. Pauline Ridge, Equitable Undue Influence and Wills, 120 L.Q. REV. 617, 622 (2004). 
 410. Roger Kerridge, Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the 
Vulnerable Testator, 59 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 310, 310 (2000).  But see Inheritance Disputes: Where 
There's a Will There's a War, TELEGRAPH, Aug. 20, 2008 (U.K.) (suggesting that inheritance 
disputes are common in England). 
 411. ROSS & REED, supra note 3, § 7.21 at 7-109. 
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influence are accompanied by allegations of lack of capacity and vice 
versa. This kind of capacity and undue influence litigation is generally 
"directed towards provoking pretrial settlements,"412 not necessarily 
because of the likelihood of success on the merits but sometimes 
because of risk that "a skilled plaintiff's lawyer will present 
evidence . . . at a public trial touching every eccentricity that might 
cast doubt upon the testator's condition . . . threatening to besmirch 
[the testator's] name."413 
Moreover, the availability of trial by jury, rather than only by 
judge, may serve to increase a litigant's desire to proceed to trial in 
America rather than settle. Because the issue of undue influence is 
largely a factual one that is dependent upon circumstantial evidence, 
it is an issue to be assessed by a jury, "which may be more disposed to 
work equity for the disinherited than to obey the directions of an 
eccentric decedent who is in any event beyond suffering."414 Some 
courts have even recognized as much and criticized parties in undue 
influence cases for presenting facts that "were well calculated to 
excite in the jury disgust and abhorrence and to lead them off from 
the true points of the case to the consideration" of the alleged 
influencer's unworthiness.415 
Finally, even the small number of cases that are fully litigated to 
a jury are not accompanied by significant disincentives for the risk of 
losing. In the United States, where each side pays its own attorneys' 
fees, the cost of trial is capped at the cost of one's attorney. On the 
other hand, both France and Germany maintain fee-shifting rules that 
impose the attorneys' fees of the winner on the loser.416 The French 
Code of Civil Procedure requires that the unsuccessful party "pay to 
the other party the amount . . . of the sums outlayed and not included 
in costs."417  Similarly, German law provides that the loser be assessed 
"statutory fees and expenses of the attorney for the successful 
party."418 The absence of a fee shifting procedure in America makes 
the penalty for unsuccessful suits minimal. Thus, "the American rule 
 
 412. Langbein, supra note 249, at 66; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 157. 
 413. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 4, at 157. 
 414. Langbein, supra note 249, at 65. 
 415. See O'Neall v. Farr, 30 S.C.L. 80 (1 Rich.). 
 416. Nouveau Code de Procédure Civil [N.C.P.C.] art. 696 (Fr.); Astrid Stadler & Wolfgang 
Hau, The Law of Civil Procedure, in GERMAN LAW, supra note 274, at 377. See generally 
NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 48-
50 (Tony Weir trans., 1982). 
 417. N.C.P.C. art. 700. 
 418. German Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 385, § 91(2) at 211. 
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diminishes the magnitude of a contestant's potential loss, which 
diminishes his disincentive to litigate an improbable claim."419 
B. Lessons About our Own Legal Systems 
In pursuit of the lessons that the above comparative analysis has 
to offer to national legal systems, the question must be bifurcated and 
separately examined to discover what the common law with its strong 
and historically-rooted concept of undue influence can learn from the 
civil law, and what the civil law with its absence of an explicit concept 
of undue influence can learn from the common law. 
1. Lessons for the Common Law: Mitigating Overstatement 
It has been said that "the common law is best understood as a 
system for promoting economic efficiency."420 In that vein, some have 
observed that "individualism and liberty . . . are two of the most 
characteristic aspects of the Common law."421 In fact, the American 
penchant for freedom of testation is just one example of the 
overriding commitment of the common law to individual liberty.  
Although the stated preference is strong and the doctrine of undue 
influence in theory helps further that goal by ensuring testamentary 
dispositions are free, the availability of undue influence is more than 
just a check on unfree dispositions. In fact, it is clear that the 
American doctrine of undue influence, which purports to preserve 
freedom and individuality, serves many of the same functions as 
devices that restrict individual freedom in the civil law. 
For example, although undue influence in general terms merely 
sets a threshold protection against the overpowering of the will, 
courts have adopted surrogate tests, such as abnormal dispositions to 
those outside the natural objects of the testator's bounty, to help 
judge instances of undue influence. Forced heirship and community 
property systems in civil law systems provide the very same 
protection against disinheritance of spouses and close relatives, even 
when a testator freely disposes of his property to those outside his 
 
 419. Langbein, supra note 249, at 65. 
 420. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 264 (6th ed. 2003). 
 421. A.G. Chloros, Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law: Three Leading Systems of 
the World, Three Kinds of Legal Thought, CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11, 15 (1978), reprinted in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURES 83, 87 (Csaba Varga ed., 1992). See also 1 FREDERICK 
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 94 (1973) ("[T]he ideal of 
individual liberty seems to have flourished chiefly among people where, at least for long 
periods, judge-made law predominated."). 
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natural bounty.  Moreover, the presumptions of undue influence that 
exist when a testator disposes of his property in a suspicious way to 
those in relationships of confidence closely mirrors the French 
conclusive presumption of captation to those similarly situated and 
the German prohibition in § 138 of exploiting those in weaker 
positions. In short, despite a wide gulf that at first appears to exist 
between common law systems oriented toward free testation and civil 
law systems concerned with family protection, the two traditions are 
much closer than they appear to be, and, in fact, the American 
commitment to freedom of testation is overstated and perhaps even a 
"myth."422 
2. Lessons for the Civil Law: The Evolving Landscape 
As the civil law institutions that are "functionally equivalent" to 
undue influence in the common law begin to erode, the need and 
frequency of challenges based on undue influence, or immorality of a 
will in Germany, are likely to increase. Scholars have observed that 
"[t]here is a tendency towards reducing [the] class of heirs entitled to 
a forced heirship"423 even in systems with historically solid 
conceptions of forced heirship. For example, the new Dutch civil code 
now limits a descendant's forced heirship claim significantly.424 
Whereas prior Dutch law considered all gifts made by the deceased 
over his lifetime, Article 67 of the new code limits the calculation of 
the statutory share to only certain gifts made within five years of the 
decedent's death.425 In Louisiana, a jurisdiction that traditionally 
maintained a strong concept of forced heirship, the institution now 
applies only to a limited class of dependent descendants who are 
either "twenty-three years of age or younger" or those "incapable of 
taking care of their persons or administering their estates."426 
Moreover, in a recent report on Succession Law, the Scottish Law 
Commission noted that "compulsory share for adult children is being 
 
 422. See Leslie, supra note 93, at 273. 
 423. Alain Verbeke and Yves-Henri Leleu, Harmonization of the Law of Succession in 
Europe, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 173, 180 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2d rev. 
ed. 1998). 
 424. See F.A.A. Duynstee & K.M.F.J. Houben, The Netherlands, in EUROPEAN SUCCESSION 
LAWS 393-94 (David Hayton ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
 425. Id. at 394. See also IAN SUMNER & HANS WARENDORF, INHERITANCE LAW 
LEGISLATION OF THE NETHERLANDS: A TRANSLATION OF BOOK 4 OF THE DUTCH CIVIL 
CODE, PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW LEGISLATION 33 
(2005) (English translation of bk. 4, art. 67(e)). 
 426. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (2000). 
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increasingly called into question even in civil law jurisdictions."427 In 
fact, the Commission issued a preliminary, tentative recommendation 
that in Scottish law the "legitim should cease to be available to adult 
children . . . .  Inheritance from a parent should no longer be viewed 
as a right."428  Even France and Germany, the classic examples of civil 
law systems,429 have begun to reduce the class of relations protected 
by forced heirship. Although descendants are still generally 
considered forced heirs, the inclusion of ascendants is waning. In 
Germany, only parents are included in ascendant forced heirship.430 
The recent revision to the French law of successions has completely 
eliminated ascendant forced heirship.431 
With the decline in forced heirship, it is not surprising to see a 
corresponding upsurge in the number of jurisdictions that allow 
claims for undue influence. Here, the experience of mixed 
jurisdictions is also insightful. Mixed jurisdictions are traditionally 
described as those "that have been influenced significantly by the civil 
law and common law families."432 They are fruitful laboratories for 
comparative purposes because they serve as examples of jurisdictions 
influenced substantially by both civil and common law and thus are 
most able to borrow or transplant beneficial devices from either one 
of its two main influential traditions. Since 1996, Louisiana, with its 
mixture of American common law and French civil law, provides that 
"[a] donation inter vivos or mortis causa shall be declared null upon 
proof that it is the product of influence by the donee or another 
person that so impaired the volition of the donor as to substitute the 
 
 427. SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, DISCUSSION PAPER ON SUCCESSION NO. 136, at 66 (2007). 
 428. Id. at 66-67. 
 429. Although other divisions or groupings of civil law families exist, the traditional division 
is between the Germanic legal family and the Romanist legal family (i.e., France and the 
jurisdictions adopting the French Civil Code). See, e.g., ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 131, at 
69; 1 PIERRE ARMINJON, BORIS NOLDE, & MARTIN  WOLFF, TRAITÉ DE DROIT COMPARÉ 42-
53 (1950). 
 430. BGB § 2303(2); see also Verbeke and Leleu, supra note 423, at 181 n.27 (noting that 
Belgium completely excludes ascendants from the category of forced heirs). 
 431. Law No. 2006-728 of June 23, 2006, J.O., June 24, 2006. 
 432. Jacques du Plessis, Comparative Study and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 8, at 477, 484.  For a discussion of 
certain minimum criteria necessary to be considered a mixed jurisdiction, see Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, Introduction to the Mixed Jurisdictions, in MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE 
THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 3, 7-10 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2001). 
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volition of the donee or other person for the volition of the donor."433 
In Scotland, which arguably is the oldest mixed jurisdiction and 
blends English common law and Roman civil law, "[a] will is . . . 
reducible . . . if [a testator was] subjected to force and fear, or to 
undue influence in relation to the will by a person in whom he 
reposed trust and who exercised a dominating influence."434  Finally, 
South Africa, which combines English common law and Roman-
Dutch civil law, recognizes undue influence as a ground for 
invalidating a will, but "[m]ere flattery, extraordinary affection shown 
to the testator, accusations made against proposed beneficiaries and 
even direct requests and other artes captatoriae will not necessarily 
constitute undue influence."435  "In order to do so they must result in 
the substitution of the wishes of another for the wishes of the 
testator."436 Thus, as the landscape of succession laws continues to 
change, solutions and lessons learned in one system or tradition can 
be borrowed by others facing the same or similar problems.437 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, although the doctrine of testamentary undue 
influence appears to be without significant presence in modern civil 
law, there are a number of functional equivalents in the civil law. The 
civilian systems contain analogues that do much the same work as the 
common law doctrine of undue influence even though they are not 
precisely identical in name or function. Explicit prohibitions on 
captation and dispositions contra bonos mores, broad conceptions of 
 
 433. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1479 (2000). The burden of proof rests on the party 
challenging the donation but the standard differs depending upon the relationship of the parties. 
See id. art. 1483. 
 434. DAVID M. WALKER, PRINCIPLES OF SCOTTISH PRIVATE LAW 155-56 (4th ed. 1989). 
 435. M. M. CORBETT ET AL., THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 86 (1980). A 
testator's mental state and ability to resist are important considerations, as is the relationship 
between the parties, such as when "a request by the one party to the other might be regarded by 
the latter as a command which must be obeyed." Id. See also M.J. DE WAAL & M.C. 
SCHOEMAN-MALAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 40-41 (3d ed. 2003). 
 436. CORBETT ET AL., supra note 435, at 86. See also DE WAAL & SCHOEMAN-MALAN, 
supra note 435, at 40-41.  Nevertheless, particular types of relationships do not give rise to 
presumptions of undue influence; the substitution of one's volition for another must be proven.  
CORBETT ET AL., supra note 435, at 86. 
 437. The new Dutch law of inheritance, effective January 1, 2003, adopts a conservative 
approach to the use of undue influence.  Although undue influence is a grounds for nullifying 
juridical acts, it generally may not be raised in connection with wills.  See Burgerlijk Wetboek 
(Civil Code) [BW], bk. 4, art. 43(1) (Neth.), in SUMNER & WARENDORF, supra note 425, at 25 
("A testamentary disposition may not nullified on the ground that it was effected by an abuse of 
circumstances."); see also id. bk. 4, art. 43(2); id. bk. 4, art. 57 at 29-30. 
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violence and Drohung, heightened standards of testamentary 
capacity, and an assortment of family protection devices are only 
some examples of such analogues. The conclusion that the two 
traditions have much common ground on the issue of undue influence 
is somewhat surprising given the absence of academic harmonization 
efforts—efforts which are pervasive in the fields of torts and 
contracts—and the lack of interest from political unification forces 
such as the European Union.438 Nonetheless, the two traditions, in 
actuality, appear much closer in substance than they at first appeared 
to be. 
The similarities, however, should not be overstated. Despite the 
similarity in outcome of cases, differences in fundamental approach 
between the common law and civil law remain. The laws of France 
and Germany are still motivated by beliefs in equal treatment of 
children and familial conceptions of property ownership, while robust 
notions of individualism and resistance to governmental intrusion still 
pervade the United States.439 Moreover, procedural incentives toward 
litigation in the United States, such as trials by juries and the lack of 
fee-shifting mechanisms, and institutional safeguards in the civil law, 
such as highly-trained notaries before whom wills may be executed, 
serve to widen the chasm between the two traditions. 
But this chasm between the law in practice in the two traditions 
might be bridged as the cultural values underlying the law continue to 
evolve. To the extent that individualism and concepts of free testation 
increase and ideas of communal identity and forced heirship 
decrease,440 the laws will likely change to reflect these new cultural 
attitudes. Some slight movement in this direction has recently 
occurred in France and Germany.  The declining use of notarial wills 
and the contemplated changes in civil procedure mechanisms441 
further serve to eliminate hurdles to harmonization.  Some have even 
 
 438. But see Commission Green Paper on Successions and Wills, COM (2005) 65 final (Mar. 
1, 2005). 
 439. See generally JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 21-82 (Thomas Dunlap trans., 
2004). 
 440. See Basil Markesinis, Learning from Europe and Learning in Europe, in THE 
GRADUAL CONVERGENCE: FOREIGN IDEAS, FOREIGN INFLUENCES AND ENGLISH LAW ON 
THE EVE OF THE 21st CENTURY 1, 31 (Basil Markesinis ed., 1994). 
 441. See, e.g., Winand Emons, Conditional Versus Contingent Fees, 59 OXFORD ECON. 
PAPERS 89, 89-101 (2007) (discussing the rise in Europe of conditional fees, which award 
lawyers a premium for winning a case). 
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observed that the litigious nature of Americans in contrast to their 
European brethren is overstated.442 
Furthermore, the harmonization in successions law has never 
been more important than it is now.  The growing mobility of people 
and the increasing tendency for marriage or similar unions without 
respect to national borders has caused an increase in the amount of 
cross-border property acquisition.443  Correspondingly, the number of 
transnational successions has also increased, which are frequently 
complicated by property holdings in various nations.444 In the 
European Union alone, "between 50,000 and 100,000 transnational 
successions are opened every year."445 
Despite the need for such harmonization, many feel that "full 
harmonisation of the rules of substantive law [of successions] . . . is 
inconceivable" at this time,446 perhaps because "the law of succession 
is embedded more deeply than other areas of the law" in the various 
national cultures and histories.447  Moreover, almost all of the modest 
international efforts concerning succession law have focused on 
procedural issues such as private international law or conflicts of 
laws.448 Even then, those efforts have met with limited success.449  
Whether or not harmonization of the substantive law of succession is 
possible or even desirable is not a question that can be easily 
answered. To do so requires a careful examination of not only the 
substantive laws each jurisdiction but also their procedural rules and 
the underlying values and mores. In that vein, this article has 
attempted to begin that examination and, at a minimum, show that 
the two traditions have much that can be learned from each other. 
 
 
 442. Basil S. Markesinis, Litigation-Mania in England, Germany and the USA: Are We So 
Very Different?, 49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 233, 274-75 (1990) ("[O]verall volumes of litigation do not 
appear to be significantly different in [England, Germany, and the U.S.]"). See also P.S. Atiyah, 
Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, DUKE L.J. 1002, 1018-44 
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 443. Commission Green Paper on Successions and Wills, supra note 438, at 3. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Terner, supra note 8, at 149. 
 446. Commission Green Paper on Successions and Wills, supra note 438, at 3. 
 447. Terner, supra note 8, at 158. 
 448. For an overview of the various international conventions on successions, see id. at 152-
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